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Hedonic-Loss Damages That Optimally Deter: An 
Alternative to “Value of a Statistical Life” That 
Focuses on Both Decedent and Tortfeasor 
MICHAEL PRESSMAN† 
Plaintiffs in wrongful-death suits typically are unable to recover for the decedent’s “hedonic 
loss”—the loss of happiness (or wellbeing) incurred as a result of the lost life-years themselves. 
Although this omission might not be a mistake on a backward-looking account of tort law 
(because the decedent is dead and arguably cannot be compensated), it is problematic on a 
forward-looking account of tort law, because it results in under-deterrence of activities causing 
death. Thus, we must provide an answer to the tricky question of what dollar sum should be 
assigned to the loss of life. The dominant framework among legal theorists for thinking about how 
tort law should determine the dollar sum is the “value of a statistical life” (VSL). In this Article, 
however, I argue that the VSL approach is mistaken. I explain why, propose an alternative, and 
explore the wide-ranging implications of my analysis. 
If we are to provide a monetary remedy for the decedent’s lost happiness, we need to translate 
the lost happiness into a monetary sum. The VSL approach does so on the decedent’s “utility 
curve,” thus taking the decedent’s wealth into account in determining the damages sum, with the 
potential tortfeasor then internalizing this monetary cost. This is a mistake. For the incentives to 
be optimal, we want the potential tortfeasor to instead internalize the amount of happiness loss 
that would be incurred by the decedent. Therefore, my account carries out the happiness-to-
money translation on the potential tortfeasor’s “utility curve”—thus taking into account the 
potential tortfeasor’s wealth and not the decedent’s wealth. 
The implications of my analysis extend beyond the context of wrongful death, providing us with 
important insights about tort law more generally, and, more generally still, about law on the 
whole. In particular, my analysis casts doubt on foundational assumptions underlying the law-
and-economics literature—simultaneously providing a new framework that law-and-economics 
theorists should employ.   
 
 †  Research Fellow at the Civil Jury Project at NYU School of Law; B.A., Philosophy, Stanford 
University, 2006; M.A., Philosophy, Stanford University, 2006; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2010; Ph.D., 
Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2018. For their insightful comments, I am indebted to: Jennifer 
Arlen, Aditi Bagchi, Rabia Belt, Tommy Bennett, Ilya Beylin, Ryan Bubb, Jonathan Choi, Patrick Corrigan, 
Courtney Cox, Guus Duindam, Barbara Fried, Mark Geistfeld, Jacob Goldin, Bob Gordon, Esther Hong, Greg 
Keating, Rebecca Kysar, Ethan Leib, Nancy Marder, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Alexander Reinert, Christopher 
Schmidt, Cathy Sharkey, Jed Shugerman, and Ben Zipursky. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In almost all states, plaintiffs in wrongful-death suits are unable to recover 
for the decedent’s “hedonic loss”—the loss of happiness1 incurred as a result of 
the lost life-years themselves.2 In those few states in which they can, they often 
do not, and, even when they do, there is much confusion and non-uniformity in 
determining damages sums.3 Because the decedent is dead and cannot be 
compensated, this omission might not be a mistake on a backward-looking 
account of tort law, according to which the purpose of tort is to provide just 
compensation. But Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner4 have argued that the 
unavailability of damages for hedonic loss is highly problematic on a forward-
looking account of tort law, which seeks to bring about optimal incentives for 
future potential tortfeasors. According to them, because tortfeasors are not now 
required to internalize all of the costs of their torts, the status quo results in 
under-deterrence of activities causing death.5 Indeed, it is often “cheaper for the 
defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him.”6 As an example, between 1984 
and 1993 in New York City,7 the average jury verdict was $1 million in cases of 
wrongful death, $3 million in cases of brain damage, and $500,000 in cases of a 
herniated disc.8 A wrongful death, however, arguably is much more than twice 
as bad as a herniated disc; but these are the typical relative damages measures—
and they have been for at least a century.9 
I agree with Sunstein and Posner that the unavailability of damages for 
hedonic loss is highly problematic on a forward-looking account of tort law. The 
next step, however, is to determine what dollar sum should be assigned to the 
loss of life. Answering this question is tricky because, while in typical cases of 
 
 1. Throughout this Article, I will frequently use the words “happiness,” “utility,” and “wellbeing.” I intend 
for all of these words to be synonymous, and I intend for each of them to be understood broadly enough to 
capture just about any view that the reader might have about the goodness in life that makes life worth living. 
 2. A small minority of “hedonic-loss states” (Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and New 
Mexico) do allow compensation for “hedonic loss” incurred by the decedent as a result of his lost years of life. 
See Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242, 244–46 (Ark. 2004); Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172, 183 (Conn. 
1976); Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 365 (Haw. 1994); Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. Dist., 733 
A.2d 394, 400–01 (N.H. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (2021); Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 
1245–46 (10th Cir. 2000) (New Mexico). 
 3. See supra note 2. 
 4. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005). 
 5. Id. at 587, 598. Jennifer Arlen also made this point in her 1985 note, An Economic Analysis of Tort 
Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1116–17 (1985). 
 6. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: 
Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 159–60 (2011). 
 7. Although this is not a recent example, it indeed is illustrative of typical relative damages amounts today 
across jurisdictions in the United States. 
 8. See Edward A. Adams, Venue Crucial to Tort Awards: Study: City Verdicts Depend on Counties, N.Y. 
L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 1. 
 9. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 84 (1972). Indeed, compensatory 
damages in wrongful death cases sometimes can be zero. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 811 (Ct. 
App. 2003); Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 160. 
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valuing loss we can rely on a plaintiff’s willingness to pay/accept, in the context 
of death we cannot because—leaving aside motivations like altruism—people 
would not accept any dollar sum in exchange for their lives. Thus, we seemingly 
must pursue a construct.  
Sunstein and Posner argue that tort law should adopt a version (and ideally 
a more individuated version) of the “value of a statistical life” (VSL), which is 
employed by regulatory law to value lives for cost-benefit analyses.10 In short, 
VSL determines the dollar sum that is the cost of a lost life by extrapolating from 
labor-force decisions and consumption decisions where people pay/accept 
certain sums of money to avoid/incur an increased chance of death of 1/10,000.11 
Sunstein and Posner and numerous other legal scholars advocating for the use 
of VSL in tort law recognize that there are a number of serious concerns about 
the chain of inferences employed in using VSL.12 For instance: Do people truly 
make such labor-force decisions freely? And do they know what the 
probabilities of death they confront are? Sunstein and Posner argue that these 
are merely questions of fine-tuning and that, while the numbers can be refined, 
the general approach is correct.13 Further, since 2005, Sunstein and many other 
legal scholars have worked to fine-tune the VSL approach.14 Thus, the VSL 
approach is the dominant framework for thinking about how tort law should 
determine a dollar sum for hedonic loss.  
I, however, believe that the VSL approach is mistaken—and for reasons 
wholly separate from the “fine-tuning” issues that do indeed plague it. In this 
Article I explain why, and I propose an alternative. I then argue that the 
implications of my analysis extend beyond the context of wrongful death, 
providing us with important insights about tort law more generally, and, more 
generally still, about law on the whole. In particular, my analysis casts doubt on 
foundational assumptions underlying the law-and-economics literature—
 
 10. See, for example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s regulations regarding motor 
vehicle safety standards. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,605, 
17,612 (Apr. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 11. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 551. 
 12. See, e.g., id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 417–18 
(2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation]; Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Lives, Life-
Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 211–12 (2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, 
and Willingness to Pay]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, 4 J. 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 237, 249–51 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some 
Clarifications and Puzzles]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE (2014); 
Robert Cooter & David DePianto, Community Versus Market Values of Life, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 
760–65 (2016); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 869, 887–96 (1998); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 229, 238–42 (2010). 
 13. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 584. 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 584–92; Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, supra note 12, at 404–21; 
Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 226–40; Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical 
Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, supra note 12, at 238; SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; Cooter & DePianto, 
supra note 12, at 755–66; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 12, at 873–76; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 12, at 
238–42. 
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simultaneously providing a new framework that law-and-economics theorists 
should employ.  
If we are to provide a monetary remedy for the loss of happiness to the 
decedent (as I agree we should, so as to bring about optimal deterrence), we will 
at some point need to translate the lost happiness into a monetary sum. The VSL 
approach does so on the decedent’s “utility curve,”15 thus taking the decedent’s 
wealth into account,16 but this is a mistake. That this is a mistake can be shown 
in a few ways, one of which is the following: 
An individuated VSL approach would give us the result that someone who 
is very poor might have a VSL of, say, $100, whereas someone who is very rich 
might have a VSL of, say $1,000,000 (as a result of the differing amounts that 
they would spend to avoid a 1/10,000 chance of death). This would give us the 
result that a tortfeasor would incur a cost of only $100 if she kills Poor, but a 
cost of $1,000,000 if she kills Rich. In addition to it seeming, equitably, that the 
decedent’s wealth should not be relevant to the damages, this disparity is also 
suboptimal from an efficiency standpoint. Stipulating that the happiness loss to 
Rich and Poor as a result of their premature deaths is the same, optimal 
incentives would induce the same care to prevent their deaths. The VSL 
approach therefore risks greatly under-deterring the killing of Poor and greatly 
over-deterring the killing of Rich. What this shows us is that the happiness-to-
money translation is happening at the incorrect point in the analysis of our topic.  
Although the disparity in damages between Rich and Poor could be 
avoided by employing a uniform VSL sum, I will argue that we should ideally 
have an individuated tort system, and, crucially, that even a uniform VSL sum 
would be inefficient because it is the tortfeasor’s wealth—not the decedent’s—
that is relevant for determining optimal incentives. I will argue that for the 
incentives to be optimal, we want the potential tortfeasor to internalize the 
amount of happiness loss that would be incurred by the decedent. This means 
that the tortfeasor should be incentivized to expend up to the amount of 
happiness that would be lost by the victim (if killed) to prevent this loss of the 
victim. These incentives would be brought about by having a damages rule that 
would force the tortfeasor to incur this happiness loss when paying tort damages. 
Damages thus should be set at the dollar sum that, if paid by the tortfeasor, would 
bring about a happiness loss to the tortfeasor equal to the happiness loss incurred 
by the decedent as a result of his premature death. Thus, on my account, the 
happiness-to-money translation occurs on the tortfeasor’s utility curve. This is 
importantly different from the VSL approach, which carries out the happiness-
to-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve.  
 
 15. See Cooter & DePianto, supra note 12, at 721; Arlen, supra note 5, at 1125. A utility curve is a graph 
that plots utility on the y-axis as a function of some good (for example, money) on the x-axis, thus (in the case 
of money) showing how a person’s utility level varies as a function of how much money he or she has. 
 16. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 580. 
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In addition, I show that even in cases not involving loss of life, optimal 
damages sums (from a forward-looking perspective) should in theory be 
determined by exploring the defendant’s utility curve, and not that of the 
plaintiff. This is a broad finding that runs counter to the commonly accepted 
theories underlying the law-and-economics literature, and, in particular, the 
willingness-to-pay literature, both of which focus on the plaintiff’s utility curve. 
In practice, however, considering only the plaintiff’s utility curve in cases 
not involving death can often be justified either by its greater administrability or 
by other practical efficiency benefits that can be effectuated by doing so. In cases 
of death, however, I argue that, from a forward-looking perspective, the 
defendant’s utility curve should be used even in practice.  
Although the vast majority of the Article explores these topics exclusively 
through a forward-looking lens, toward the end I expand my focus to include the 
backward-looking account of tort law, and I explore how it affects my proposal. 
I argue that in the context of non-death cases, the backward-looking account 
provides a strong explanation for why we might, in practice, use the utility 
curves of plaintiffs. In the context of death cases, however, we seemingly have 
a situation where compensation is not possible, yet deterrence is. Thus, even if 
one typically thinks that the forward-looking account and backward-looking 
accounts of tort are both intrinsically part of the picture, it seems that death cases 
are unique in that compensation for the hedonic loss arguably is off the table, 
and all that remains is potential deterrence of activities that might cause hedonic 
loss. Thus, I conclude that, in death cases, my proposal, couched in the forward-
looking account, should indeed be implemented. After coming to this 
conclusion, I further explore the interesting underlying finding that death cases 
are uniquely positioned to teach us about the relationship between forward-
looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law because death cases enable 
us to explore the forward-looking account in a rare instance when it arguably is 
not accompanied by the backward-looking account.   
In addition to offering my positive proposal for death cases, I also consider 
several theoretical and practical issues that arise in implementing it, and I offer 
a number of proposals for reform. Many of these proposed reforms will aim to 
learn from the context of punitive damages; there, unlike in most other areas of 
damages, defendants’ wealth is already considered relevant to the determination 
of damages—as I argue it should be in the context of wrongful death.  
In the course of making the Article’s arguments against the VSL approach 
and in favor of my proposed alternative, I argue against current wisdom on the 
topic, including the views of Sunstein, Posner, Viscusi, Polinsky, Shavell, Arlen, 
and Geistfeld, among others.  
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide important background. 
First, I provide an overview of the current state of the law, which does not allow 
recovery for a decedent’s hedonic loss. Then, I explain the VSL approach to 
determining the dollar figure to be used as compensation for lost life and argue 
that common “fine-tuning” criticisms of it are unlikely to be fatal. Next, after 
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describing a number of specific versions of the VSL approach that have been 
espoused by various legal theorists, I canvas some alternative approaches to 
determining such damages and argue none of them is promising. This overview 
of the literature shows that VSL represents the dominant framework for thinking 
about how tort law should determine the dollar value for a decedent’s hedonic 
loss.  
In Part II, I give my reasons for thinking that the VSL approach is 
mistaken—reasons that are wholly separate from the “fine-tuning” issues that 
do indeed plague it. In my view, the problem with the VSL account is that it 
carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve. In 
Part II, I provide two different ways of showing why this is a problem. The 
second of these reasons then segues well into an articulation of my own 
alternative proposal for how to determine the dollar sum to attribute to a 
decedent’s hedonic loss—the key feature of which is that it carries out the 
happiness-to-money translation on the tortfeasor’s utility curve instead of on the 
decedent’s.  
Then, in Part III, I describe the various details of my alternative proposal—
some details of which are theoretical, and others of which are practical and 
procedural. Toward the end of Part III, I argue that my analysis provides us with 
an important insight about tort law more generally (and, even more generally, 
about law-and-economics approaches to law on the whole): Even in cases not 
involving death, damages sums (from a forward-looking perspective) should in 
theory be determined by exploring the tortfeasor’s utility curve and not that of 
the plaintiff.17 The extension of my theory to areas in tort not involving death—
and to areas of the law other than tort—serves not only to provide more general 
insights, but also to provide further support for my main positive proposal 
regarding how to determine which dollar sum to attribute to a decedent’s hedonic 
loss in wrongful-death cases.   
In Part IV, I raise and respond to a number of objections that one might 
have in response to my positive proposal. In Part V, I then (1) explain why (from 
a forward-looking perspective), in death cases, we should not only adopt my 
account in theory, but also implement it in practice; (2) expand my focus to 
include consideration of the backward-looking account—both for the purpose of 
exploring how it affects my proposal and for the purpose of discussing how the 
death case is uniquely positioned to teach us about the relationship between the 
two accounts; and (3) I briefly describe concerns that could be raised about 
 
 17. Although this Article briefly touches upon the extensions for non-death cases and non-tort cases of this 
Article’s proposal for death cases, these extensions are only summarized and addressed briefly. The full 
discussion of how this Article’s proposal applies in non-death cases can be found in a separate article of mine. 
See Michael Pressman, The Relevance of Defendants’ Wealth for Forward-Looking, Backward-Looking, and 
Mixed Accounts of Tort Damages, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2021). In that article, I provide an in-depth 
exploration of cases not involving death and explain why, despite prima facie appearances to the contrary, my 
theory, as discussed in the death context, is both descriptively and normatively plausible in the non-death 
context—at least in theory, even if not in practice. 
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whether the use of tort law in the way I propose in this Article is the best legal 
machinery we have (as opposed to, say, criminal law or punitive damages) for 
pursuing this Article’s goals. Lastly, I bring the Article to a close with a brief 
conclusion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE LAW AND THE PROBLEMS WITH IT 
There are several things plaintiffs can recover for in wrongful death suits 
in tort—regardless of whether it technically is a “survival action”18 (brought by 
the decedent’s estate), or a “wrongful-death action”19 (brought by, for example, 
a decedent’s spouse on behalf of the decedent). Among the things that plaintiffs 
can recover for in these suits are lost financial support for the surviving spouse 
(which is a function of the decedent’s income, projected consumption, and so 
on), consortium, and pain and suffering experienced by the decedent himself 
before his death.20   
One notable omission from this list, however, is damages for the “hedonic 
loss” incurred by the decedent by having his life shortened—that is, the loss of 
happiness (or, said differently, “life’s pleasures”21) that the decedent would have 
experienced in his future years of life but for his premature death.22 Almost no 
state permits recovery for such losses. A small minority of “hedonic-loss states” 
do allow compensation for “hedonic loss” incurred by the decedent as a result 
of his lost years of life.23 But, even in these states, courts do not always provide 
recovery for the hedonic loss caused by the lost years, and, where they do, there 
is no clear system for calculating these damages, and the courts’ opinions are 
rife with confusion.24  
Arguably, the purposes of tort law are both (1) backward-looking (to 
provide a plaintiff with compensation for the losses he has incurred, thus 
attempting to make him whole),25 and (2) forward-looking (for damage awards 
to provide the optimally efficient incentives for future potential tortfeasors).26 In 
 
 18. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 1117–18. 
 19. Id.  
 20. See, e.g., In re Delmoro, 48 Misc. 3d 628, 632–33 (Sur. Ct. 2015). 
 21. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 544.  
 22. See id. at 569–70. 
 23. See cases cited supra note 2. 
 24. See cases cited supra note 2; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 545. 
 25. For examples of well-known articulations of corrective justice theory (a main example of a backward-
looking theory), see Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992); Jules L. Coleman, The 
Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); 
JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 
(2001); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2012). 
 26. For examples of well-known articulations of the forward-looking, law-and-economics view, see GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Richard A. Posner, Wealth 
Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra 
note 25, at 99.  
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straightforward cases, these two goals can be brought about by requiring the 
tortfeasor to compensate the plaintiff for his losses, thus simultaneously: (1) 
making the plaintiff whole; and (2) bringing it about that future potential 
tortfeasors internalize the externalities that they would otherwise impose, thus 
leading to efficient behavior.27   
It may seem that the current state of the law is defensible from the 
backward-looking perspective. After all, it is true that the decedent himself 
cannot be compensated—indeed, he is not even in existence and thus cannot 
receive money. While perhaps the family could recover these sums, the family 
is (ideally) already being compensated for ways in which they are harmed, and 
the focus of this category of damages (“hedonic loss”) is on a form of loss that 
is to the decedent himself—namely for his lost years of life. Awarding sums for 
the decedent’s hedonic losses to the family would constitute a windfall, and it 
seems that for the limited purpose of this type of loss, there might be no problem 
(through the backward-looking lens of tort law) with the current state of the law 
because the decedent indeed cannot be compensated. From a backward-looking 
perspective, the inability to recover for “hedonic loss” might be right. One 
might, however, deny that it is right even through a backward-looking lens, and 
one might say that the decedent’s estate should be compensated and its failure 
to be compensated renders the current state of the law wrong even through a 
backward-looking lens. After all, a decedent’s estate is a legal fiction that 
survives the decedent’s death and perhaps the failure to compensate the 
decedent’s estate for the “hedonic loss” does indeed show the state of the law to 
be a mistake even through a backward-looking lens. I leave this question aside 
and simply state that a strong case can be made that with respect to the backward-
looking lens, the current state of the law is not making a mistake.  
Even if there is no mistake with the current state of the law if looked at 
through the backward-looking lens, this is not so if looked at through a forward-
looking lens. On a forward-looking account, it seems that a failure to require 
tortfeasors to pay the cost associated with the hedonic loss to the decedent would 
be a mistake, even if the person who incurred the loss can no longer be 
compensated. This is because failing to include the cost of the hedonic loss in 
the damages sum would understate (potentially grossly) the (hedonic) cost of the 
tortfeasor’s behavior. All else equal, happy people do not want to die, and we 
typically think a person incurs a cost by being killed—even if he cannot be 
compensated for this. Thus, the current state of the law seemingly under-deters 
behavior that could result in killing people. Without requiring the tortfeasor to 
pay any cost capturing the loss to the decedent, the law cannot provide optimal 
incentives. Consider, for example, the counterintuitive implication of the current 
state of the law that, all else equal, it could be better for a tortfeasor for his 
 
 27. See Michael Pressman, The Compatibility of Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking Accounts of 
Tort Law, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 45, 75 (2016). 
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behavior to leave a victim dead than to leave the victim injured.28 Indeed, as 
mentioned in the Introduction, it is often cheaper for the defendant to kill the 
plaintiff than to injure him, and between 1984 and 1993 in New York City, the 
average jury verdict was $1 million in cases of wrongful death and $3 million in 
cases of brain damage (and $500,000 in cases of a herniated disc—which, when 
compared to the average verdicts for wrongful death, is particularly 
noteworthy).29 
In sum, it seems that even if the current state of the law in this domain is 
not making a mistake from a backward-looking perspective (and an argument 
could be made that it is making a mistake even from a backward-looking 
perspective as well), it is making a mistake from a forward-looking perspective. 
Tort law thus should allow for damages for a decedent’s hedonic loss. 
Regardless of whether the money for “hedonic loss” would go to the family of 
the decedent, to the state (perhaps into a pool to provide money to future 
wrongful death plaintiffs who have cases against poor and thus relatively 
judgment-proof defendants), or to whomever else, what seems necessary is that 
the tortfeasor be required to pay damages not only for the various other aspects 
of wrongful death suits that they are currently required to pay damages for, but 
that they also be required to pay damages for the hedonic loss incurred by the 
decedent for his lost years of life.  
Even if one were on board with this forward-looking claim, if one thinks 
that there is currently no mistake on a backward-looking account, one might be 
concerned that bringing about a change to fix the mistake through the forward-
looking lens might introduce a mistake (that is, too much compensation) through 
the backward-looking lens. This concern could be avoided, however, as alluded 
to above, by various possible ways of requiring tortfeasors to pay for hedonic 
loss but having these sums get paid not to the family of the decedent but rather 
to the state. Thus, requiring tortfeasors to pay for a decedent’s “hedonic loss” is 
not problematic from the backward-looking perspective even if it turns out to 
not be required by it. Conversely, it enables us to fix what is clearly a mistake in 
the law from the forward-looking perspective.   
Before continuing, however, it is worth flagging that although Sunstein and 
Posner, Arlen, and many authors to be discussed below in Part I.B (for example, 
Cooter and DePianto and Shavell and Polinsky)30 agree that there should be 
recovery for a decedent’s loss, so as to avoid under-deterrence, not all theorists 
agree on this point. Some theorists argue that allowing recovery for a decedent’s 
hedonic loss would make damages sums inefficiently high and thus bring about 
 
 28. Of course, punitive damages for intentional behavior and also criminal law could in many cases prevent 
tortfeasors from actually ever confronting these perverse incentives, but there might be situations where the 
perverse incentives do, in practice, still remain; further, even if punitive damages and criminal consequences 
fully mitigated these perverse incentives in practice, it still would be the case that from the narrower perspective 
of tort law’s account of compensation the current state of the law would have this odd counterintuitive feature. 
 29. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text.  
 30. See infra Part I.B. 
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over-deterrence.31 However, although perhaps reasonable minds can differ on 
whether there should be recovery for a decedent’s hedonic loss in order to bring 
about optimal incentives, I will not debate this further, and, going forward, I will 
assume that there indeed should be recovery for a decedent’s hedonic loss.  
B. THE SUNSTEIN / POSNER SUGGESTION FOR REFORM: USING “VALUE OF A 
STATISTICAL LIFE” (VSL) 
Determining that tort law should allow for damages for the hedonic loss 
incurred by the decedent is the first key step away from the status quo, and not 
only do I espouse this, but so too do Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner (hereinafter 
“S&P”) in their 2005 article Dollars and Death.32 They and I are in agreement 
on this score. The next key step, however, in arguing for this reform, is to address 
the question of how to determine how much a decedent’s hedonic loss should be 
worth in terms of dollars—that is, the question of how much a tortfeasor should 
have to pay in damages for causing the decedent’s hedonic loss. This is a very 
tricky question to answer.  
As S&P say, some people will say that life is priceless and thus it is 
demeaning, and cheapens life, to try to put a value on it.33 But, as S&P note, it 
seems much more demeaning to stick with the status quo (providing zero dollars 
for the hedonic loss) than it would be to assign a dollar sum to the hedonic loss.34 
We want the sum to be greater than zero.  
Typically, when valuing things, we can either ask or infer from people’s 
actions what they are willing to pay (“WTP”) for something (or to avoid 
something), or, similarly, what they would be willing to accept (“WTA”) for 
 
 31. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation for Wrongful Death 
and Personal Injury, 20 J. FORENSIC ECON. 113, 126–27 (2007) [hereinafter Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic 
Damages Measure of Compensation]. According to Kip Viscusi, the result of allowing recovery for a decedent’s 
hedonic loss will be “an unprecedented level of excessive compensation from the standpoint of both deterrence 
and insurance.” Id. at 134. Elaborating on this position, he writes: 
  Greater damages levels that arise from the introduction of hedonic damages as a standard 
compensation component in turn will impose higher costs on insurers and defendants in such cases. 
These higher costs will boost insurer premiums, raise product prices, lead doctors to undertake 
additional defensive medicine efforts, and have other adverse economic consequences. If, of 
course, damages were initially set at too low a level, then such ramifications would be the result of 
installing a more efficient damages regime. Btu the practical difficulty is that compensation for 
hedonic losses will not foster optimal damages levels but will instead make damages inefficiently 
high so that the economic repercussions will be inefficient. 
Id. at 129; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Policy Challenges of the Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life, 6 
FOUNDS. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 99, 100 (2010) (arguing that damages for hedonic losses in tort would 
lead to “excessive levels of compensatory damages and would greatly increase damage amounts”). As we will 
see in Part I.B, infra, however, Viscusi seemingly argues elsewhere that we should allow recovery for “hedonic 
loss” damages—albeit in the form of punitive damages and not compensatory damages. 
 32. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4. 
 33. Id. at 553.  
 34. Id.  
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something (or to avoid something).35 But, when we attempt to use this approach 
to put a price on an immediate loss of one’s life, it does not help us in the way 
that it would in more typical cases. This is because—leaving aside cases of 
altruism and other related issues—there is no sum of money that a person would 
accept in return for giving up his life in an immediate death. There is no amount 
of money that would make a person indifferent between (1) not having one’s life 
end in an immediate death and not receiving a monetary payment, and (2) having 
one’s life end in an immediate death but receiving a monetary payment. Or, said 
differently, there is no amount of money that could make the person whole after 
incurring the harm of having his life brought to an immediate end and losing out 
on his entire future. The amount required to be paid to the decedent to trade away 
his life would therefore be infinite.  
But, as Jennifer Arlen (among others) has discussed, do we really want the 
tortfeasor who has caused a death to be required to pay every single dollar he 
owns (even if it is billions of dollars) to pay for causing the decedent’s hedonic 
loss?36 It seems that the answer is “no,” because if this were the law, all sorts of 
productive activities and behavior in society could come to a standstill out of 
people’s fear that they might negligently cause a death and that they would then 
be bankrupted.37 Accordingly, Arlen argues that in determining how to calculate 
damages in this area of the law, we must take into account the fact that we are 
all potential involuntary sellers of lives and involuntary buyers of lives, and that 
we thus must come up with a rule for how to price hedonic loss that reflects the 
bilateral nature of the problem, rather than simply coming up with a damages 
sum.38 In Part IV.C, I return to Arlen’s point and her arguments;39 suffice it to 
say here that it does not seem as though pricing the hedonic loss at an infinite 
number of dollars (which in practice would amount to however much wealth the 
defendant possesses) is the answer that we want.  
Since we want the hedonic loss to be worth neither zero dollars nor an 
infinite number of dollars, how are we to come up with a reasonable (and non-
arbitrary) amount of dollars that will reflect the hedonic loss to the decedent? In 
light of our seeming inability to use WTP/WTA in these cases, it seems that we 
must invent some sort of a construct that can sidestep the difficulties confronted 
by WTP/WTA in this context and provide us with a dollar sum to attribute to the 
lost life. In deciding how to think about these issues, S&P explore regulatory 
law’s treatment of the issue of valuing life, and they argue that tort law should 
implement a version of the approach that is taken in that domain: the “value of 
a statistical life” (VSL).40 
 
 35. See generally Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, supra note 
12. 
 36. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 1116. 
 37. Id. at 1117. 
 38. Id. at 1135. 
 39. See infra Part IV.C. 
 40. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 553–57. 
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S&P compare the way in which tort law and regulatory law employ 
approaches to the question of valuing life that differ in various ways, and they 
discuss the ways in which each domain can improve by adopting some of the 
methods employed by the other domain.41 As they say, some of the differences 
can be understood because of the different contexts in which regulatory law and 
tort law operate (and it is perhaps even good that they differ), but both areas have 
huge omissions of different types and are in serious need of improvement.42 S&P 
argue that both frameworks can learn a lot from the other, and thus that both 
domains are in need of reform to incorporate aspects of the other domain.43 In 
this Article, however, I focus merely on tort law’s omissions (namely its failure 
to allow recovery for hedonic loss for lost years of life), and on how tort might 
be able to learn from how regulatory law handles valuation-of-life issues—thus 
leaving aside questions of how regulatory law’s treatment of valuation-of-life 
issues might be able to be improved. Further, I focus only on what tort law 
should do regarding compensating for hedonic loss of the decedent for his lost 
years of life—thus completely leaving out of the discussion the various other 
claims included in wrongful death suits (for example, financial support for 
family members, consortium, and so on). The exclusive question going forward 
will be the question of how to price the hedonic loss to the decedent (for his lost 
years of life), such that tort law can provide appropriate incentives and 
deterrence for future potential tortfeasors.  
Unlike tort law, regulatory law does take the hedonic loss to decedents into 
account (and it has been doing so the since the 1980s).44 It does so via sums that 
are uniform across people, and which are called “value of a statistical life” 
(VSL), and sometimes via sums called “value of statistical life-years” (VSLY).45 
Currently, in today’s dollars, the VSL sum is approximately $9 million.46 The 
VSL approach works as follows:  
VSL infers a price that people put on their own lives based on what people 
have paid or accepted in consumption and labor-force decisions—with the 
majority of the data coming from labor-force decisions.47 More specifically, 
VSL calculates the dollar value of the loss of life to decedents by seeing how 
much people (in datasets covering hundreds of thousands of people) are willing 
to pay or accept for an additional 1/10,000 risk of death (which studies have 
found, in today’s dollars, to be approximately $900).48 Then, we multiply $900 
 
 41. Id. at 538–43. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 542–43.  
 44. Id. at 549. 
 45. See id. at 551; see, e.g., id. at 538 n.9. 
 46. Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Valuing Reductions in Fatal Illness Risks: Implications of 
Recent Research, 25 HEALTH ECON. 1039 (2016); see also GLOBAL HEALTH PRIORITY-SETTING: BEYOND COST-
EFFECTIVENESS 113 (Ole F. Norheim, Exekiel J. Emanuel & Joseph Millum eds., 2020). 
 47. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 557. 
 48. See id. at 551; Robinson & Hammitt, supra note 46; see also GLOBAL HEALTH PRIORITY-SETTING: 
BEYOND COST-EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 46, at 113. 
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by 10,000 to extrapolate to the dollar value of a whole life. The thought is that 
if the value of a 1/10,000 chance of death is a certain price, then we can multiply 
by that percent chance to see what the value of the whole life is.49  
In my view, there are serious concerns with this approach. It is important 
to note, though, that in a typical case (that is, a case that does not involve death 
or the shortening of life), this maneuver would not be creating a “construct” in 
its attempt to value the bad event of which at first there only is a risk. In the 
typical case, where the bad event does not involve death or a shortening of a life, 
the inferred value is not a construct at all; in such cases it indeed represents the 
cost of the bad event occurring, assuming no risk-aversion or time-value-of-
money issues. For example, if a person is willing to pay $1,000 (R) to avoid a 
ten percent risk of a bad event happening the following month (r), then (given 
the assumptions I mentioned), we can infer that the harm of the bad event the 
following month would be R/r (that is, $10,000). Further, given the same 
assumptions, this inference would be sound even in a case of non-economic 
damages. Hence, in typical cases we can infer the cost of a bad event from what 
one would pay to avoid a given percentage of risk that this event occurs. In such 
cases it would be equivalent in terms of deterrence, as S&P say, to either have a 
tortfeasor pay R to all whom the risk is imposed on, or to pay R/r (that is, the 
cost of the bad event) but to only those who actually have the bad event happen 
to them.50 As S&P say, these two options (the ex ante option and the ex post 
option) would also be equivalent not only from a deterrence perspective, but also 
from the perspective of compensation for plaintiffs.51   
According to S&P, this VSL framework enables us in cases involving loss 
of life to create a construct that takes, as inputs, the amounts people value certain 
low risks of death, and then provides us with an output that is the dollar value to 
a person of his whole life.52 This, of course, is a mere construct, because if asked 
how much money one would accept for having one’s life end immediately, there 
is no sum that one would accept. But that is precisely why we are in search for 
a construct—because seemingly without one we are unable to put a dollar sum 
on losing the entire remainder of one’s life. 
VSL as a system has various limitations and S&P acknowledge many of 
these (despite espousing VSL as a system that tort law should use—albeit with 
some tweaks).53 I discuss some of these limitations below. All of the following 
limitations, however, are not necessarily objections that render the theory 
unworkable; rather they are various problems that could probably be addressed 
by tweaking the system or perhaps simply recognizing that the VSL approach 
inherently lacks some accuracy. The following limitations, for the most part, do 
 
 49. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 557. 
 50. Id. at 556. 
 51. Id. at 556–57. 
 52. Id. at 557. 
 53. Id. 
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not really shake the core of the VSL approach. This seems to be why, despite 
these issues, S&P (and many other authors, too) still endorse the VSL 
framework.   
Before mentioning the main and common objections to VSL, I first 
mention an objection to VSL and a suggestion for a tweaking of it that S&P 
themselves raise: S&P argue that tort law should not use a uniform VSL, but it 
should instead tailor to more specifics of a person.54 This individuation, they 
say, could happen in a few ways. It could be more tailored to age and wealth and 
also other factors that typically might make people’s willingness to pay to avoid 
risks very different across groups.55 (There is evidence, unsurprisingly, that age 
and wealth are among the factors that affect how much one’s personalized VSL 
would be.56)  
Leaving aside for the moment this specific suggestion offered by S&P, 
what follows are some of the many common problems, limitations, and 
objections that are raised against VSL (and, typically, conceded by proponents 
of VSL to afflict VSL). Many of these objections are rooted in behavioral 
economics. 
First off, the limitations that are not directly rooted in behavioral 
economics:  
There is a question of whether the studies about choices between jobs in 
the work force based on salary and risk of death truly establish what they purport 
to establish. There can be questions of the methodology of these studies and 
whether they indeed provide plausible support for their results. One might think 
that they do not actually even support the conclusions about people being willing 
to pay $900 to avoid an increase of risk of death by 1/10,000. For one, it is 
unclear whether we can accurately determine that the riskier job increases risk 
of death by precisely 1/10,000.57  Second, it is not always clear that people at all 
know the risks of the different options that they are confronting and purportedly 
weighing (much less, that they know these risks with accuracy and precision).58  
Third, it is not always clear how much of a choice a person in the labor-force 
has when confronted with particular job conditions, or, even if there is some 
choice, how much freedom the person feels that they have in this choice—in 
light of various constraints in their life.59 Also, there might be various other risks 
of death that are not being taken into account but which are part of the equation 
(for example, higher risks of death associated with having a lower-paying job 
 
 54. Id. at 566–68. 
 55. Id. at 567. 
 56. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market 
Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 36, 50–51 (2003); Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, 
and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 231–34; Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers’ 
Value of Statistical Life 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 10199, 2003). 
 57. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 551, 563–64. 
 58. See id. at 564. 
 59. Id. at 565. 
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and thus not being able to afford certain consumption items, medical services, 
or luxuries that might bring about countervailing lowered chances of death). 
Now, as for a few of the many limitations more rooted in behavioral 
economics: 
For one, people apparently have different assessments (in terms of what 
they would pay to avoid an increase in risk of death by 1/10,000) for different 
levels of baseline risk that they have of death, and what percent risk one would 
be moving to, so extrapolation does not always give the same numbers (holding 
steady that the amount of risk is increased by 1/10,000). The sum we get is 
largely a function of which baseline percent risk we use, because the dollar sum 
is very different at different points of baseline risk. The curve is non-linear. As 
a result, it seems arbitrary which percent to use to extrapolate from.60  
Additionally, even if the curve were linear and the baseline risk level not 
arbitrary,61 there still would be a key additional difficulty related to the calculus. 
Human beings are notorious for being bad at making rational decisions in the 
context of extremely low probabilities.62 Be it over-valuing or under-valuing 
these probabilities (we have been found to exhibit each of these types of 
mistakes in different contexts), we are bad at using these numbers.63 As a result, 
it really is not clear whether we should put any stock at all in the precise sums 
people are willing to pay or accept as a result of these low risks. Further, since 
these dollar sums to avoid the 1/10,000 risk (for example, $900) are then 
multiplied by 10,000 to get the VSL, the VSL could be far off due to a small 
variance in the dollar sum for accepting the 1/10,000 risk. Thus, when it really 
might have been somewhat arbitrary and due to non-rational processes that one 
decides to pay $100 versus $1,000 to avoid the tiny risk, such irrelevant 
differences would result in the difference between a VSL of $1 million and one 
of $10 million. This huge difference would be arbitrary and not reflect what we 
are thinking and hoping that it reflects.64  
Despite all of these limitations of the VSL approach (and the foregoing 
only describes some of the limitations), S&P still believe that a version of VSL 
should be used to put a dollar sum on the hedonic loss incurred by decedents for 
their lost years of life in wrongful death suits.65 In their view, these concerns 
 
 60. See id. at 557. 
 61. And even if we assume that we can determine that the riskier job increases the risk of death by precisely 
1/10,000, which, as I’ve stated, there could be doubts about. 
 62. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. 
BUS. S251, S272–73 (1986). 
 63. See id. at S274–75. 
 64. An additional issue involves figuring out details about the behavioral economics associated with the 
differences between WTP and WTA sums. There is reason to think that our sums differ depending on whether 
one confronts decisions in a WTP or WTA context, and if the sums indeed are different, there’s then a question 
of which framework to use. For an overview of this literature, see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and 
Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2002). Further, there are a number of additional concerns for the VSL 
approach arising out of behavioral economics—even beyond those discussed here. 
 65. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 587–90. 
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with VSL are merely fine-tuning types of concerns, and not concerns that shake 
the core of the VSL approach.66 Further, as I describe below, a large number of 
others agree with S&P that VSL is indeed the approach that should be used for 
hedonic loss in wrongful death suits in tort, and that even if some tweaks are 
necessary, VSL indeed is the correct general approach to use.67  
I agree with these authors that the various limitations discussed above 
probably do not shake the very core of the VSL approach. I disagree, however, 
with the view that VSL is the correct general approach. To the contrary, I argue 
that it is mistaken altogether—and for reasons wholly separate from the “fine-
tuning” issues that indeed plague the VSL approach. In the following Parts, I 
explain why the VSL approach is misguided, and propose an alternative. Before 
doing so, however, I first provide some additional background about approaches 
that authors have taken to the question of how to assign a dollar figure to a 
decedent’s hedonic loss—both outside of the VSL framework and within the 
VSL framework. 
C. CANVASING OTHER VSL AND NON-VSL APPROACHES 
This Subpart provides some additional background regarding the 
approaches that have been taken to the question of how to assign a dollar figure 
to a decedent’s hedonic loss—both outside of the VSL framework and within 
the VSL framework. The purpose of this discussion is threefold. First, I aim 
simply to describe what has been said in the literature on the topic of hedonic-
loss damages, both before and after 2005. Second, I aim to show both that the 
VSL approach is the dominant way of thinking about how to assign a dollar sum 
to hedonic loss, and that, given the existing alternatives, this is for good reason. 
The VSL approach is indeed the best proposal that we currently have for how to 
assign a dollar sum to hedonic loss. It is better than the other accounts that have 
been articulated. Third, showing that (1) the positive proposal presented here is 
novel and (2) VSL is not only dominant but also the best of all currently available 
proposals, paves the way for this Article’s main argument. After all, if VSL is 
better than existing alternatives, I need only show that the positive proposal of 
this Article is better than VSL to establish that it is the best available approach.  
1. Within the VSL Approach 
I first consider examples of authors espousing the VSL approach to 
assigning a dollar sum to a decedent’s hedonic loss.  
First, Sunstein himself has continued to advocate this general approach, 
and, in the years since Dollars and Death, he has written a number of articles 
aimed at fine-tuning and improving the VSL approach. In Valuing Life: A Plea 
for Disaggregation, he argued that a uniform VSL measure is not what we 
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 67. See infra Part I.C. 
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should use, but rather that we should use a measure that is more individuated in 
various ways.68 According to him, a uniform figure to measure the value of a 
statistical life is a serious mistake: “The very theory that underlies [VSL] calls 
for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that theory, VSL 
should vary across risk. More controversially, VSL should vary across 
individuals—even or especially if the result would be to produce a lower number 
for some people than others.”69 Additionally, one of the main specific ways in 
which Sunstein thinks that there should be greater individuation is that the 
damages sum for hedonic loss should vary based on how many years of life it is 
expected that the decedent has lost.70 The thought is that someone who loses 
more years of life is incurring a more substantial loss than someone who loses 
fewer years. Thus, all else equal, individuation should occur along the dimension 
of the decedent’s age. Sunstein thus argues that instead of using VSL (value of 
a statistical life), we should use VSLY (“value of statistical life-years”).71 
According to Sunstein, “the hard question involves not whether to undertake this 
shift, but how to monetize life-years.”72 Sunstein has also addressed a number 
of other important and interesting questions that arise within the general VSL 
framework.73 
Many other authors have also signed on to the VSL approach for assigning 
a dollar sum to damages for a decedent’s hedonic loss. These authors typically 
argue for a particular version of VSL or for particular tweaks to the way in which 
it would be used. For instance, in Community Versus Market Values of Life,74 
Robert Cooter and David DePianto explore the differences between 
“community” and “market” VSL. According to them, the VSL framework can 
derive dollar sums by extrapolating from dollars spent by individuals in their 
consumption decisions and labor-force decisions reflecting choices regarding 
risks of death, and it can also carry out these extrapolations by focusing on how 
“[c]ommunities balance risk and cost through social norms of precaution, which 
prescribe how much risk people may impose on others and on themselves. For 
example, social norms dictate that bicyclists should wear helmets and 
automobile passengers should wear seat belts.”75 According to Cooter and 
DePianto, there are considerable differences between the average dollar values 
for VSL derived in the “individual” (“market”) context and those derived in the 
“community” context; they argue we ought to endorse the use of community 
VSLs in tort.76  
 
 68. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, supra note 12, at 404–05. 
 69. Id. at 385.  
 70. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 208–09, 240–41. 
 71. Id. at 206. 
 72. Id. at 205.  
 73. See, e.g., Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, supra note 12, at 
237; SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5. 
 74. Cooter & DePianto, supra note 12, at 713–14. 
 75. Id. at 713. 
 76. Id. at 755–58. 
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Other examples of prominent authors in the VSL camp are A. Mitchell 
Polinsky and Steven Shavell. According to them, compensatory damages in 
wrongful death cases should equal the VSL sum.77 
Also in the camp of proponents of VSL in the context of hedonic-loss 
damages are Joni Hersch and Kip Viscusi.78 The account that they offer is 
somewhat different from those discussed so far here, however, because, while 
these other accounts have involved the VSL sum being a component of the 
compensatory damages sum, Hersch and Viscusi argue that the VSL sum should 
be used in order to determine the punitive damages sum.79 According to them, 
the VSL sum should be used to set the total damages amount needed for 
deterrence in wrongful death cases; however, they argue that the compensatory 
sum should be kept as is, and that the punitive damages sum should be altered 
to make the total damages sum equal the VSL sum.80 They write:  
  [We] propose[] the following punitive damages formula for wrongful 
death cases: the total value of punitive damages plus compensatory damages 
should equal the VSL. To achieve this equality, there should be no change in 
current practices regarding the value of compensatory damages. Rather, the 
entire adjustment should be made to punitive damages, which should be set to 
equal the VSL minus the value of compensatory damages. [We] elaborate[] 
on this proposal, indicating how it can be modified to account for unusually 
large economic losses and a low probability of detection.81 
According to Hersch and Viscusi, it would be misguided for the full VSL 
sum to represent compensatory damages, because this would “undermine[] the 
current function of compensatory damages,”82 which, they argue, is 
compensation and insurance.83 Despite the differences between Hersch and 
Viscusi’s account and the other VSL accounts mentioned so far, however, 
Hersch and Viscusi are nevertheless indeed proponents of the VSL account as 
well.  
As these examples illustrate, many prominent authors defend various 







 77. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 12, at 889–91, 941–42 (arguing that, in wrongful death cases, 
compensatory damages should equal the VSL, regardless of whether the damages measure also includes punitive 
damages). 
 78. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 12, at 229. 
 79. Id. at 230–31.  
 80. Id. at 231.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 229.  
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2. Non-VSL Approaches to Determining Damages Sums for a 
Decedent’s Hedonic Loss 
While some authors have argued that there should not be compensation at 
all for a decedent’s hedonic loss,84 not all authors who argue that there should 
be compensation for a decedent’s hedonic loss are proponents of the VSL 
approach. I note here a few such examples. 
First, Andrew Jay McClurg argued that we should provide damages for a 
decedent’s hedonic loss even before S&P’s article.85 According to him, any 
attempt to put a dollar sum on the lost life is problematic, and the best solution 
is simply for legislatures to determine an arbitrary but uniform sum.86 
Frank Cross and Charles Silver similarly argue for the adoption of a 
“presumptive minimum award” in wrongful death cases, to correct for under-
compensation and associated under-deterrence.87 Like McClurg, they espouse 
the use of an arbitrary sum to be assigned to a decedent’s hedonic loss.88   
While these authors are right to argue that there should be damages 
recoverable for a decedent’s hedonic loss, that it is difficult to come up with a 
principled account of what the appropriate damages sum should be, and that an 
arbitrary sum would be better than no damages sum, the VSL approach does 
better than the “arbitrary sum” approach. This is because VSL at least is 
attempting to provide a principled basis for the particular damages sum to be 
assigned to the decedent’s hedonic loss. Even if one thinks (as I do) that the VSL 
approach is mistaken, it still, at the very worst, is on a par with the “arbitrary 
sum” approach, because at the very worst, VSL would turn out to be an 
“arbitrary sum.” VSL is either a superior approach or it itself is an arbitrary sum. 
Thus, while the McClurg and Cross and Silver points are not bad, we can do 
better (be it with the VSL approach or with something else).  
Some other non-VSL approaches have been taken as well, but, as with the 
McClurg and Cross and Silver approaches, they do not seem to provide ways to 
assign a non-arbitrary damages sum to a decedent’s hedonic loss.89  
3. Summary Regarding VSL and Non-VSL Approaches to Determining 
Damages Sums for a Decedent’s Hedonic Loss  
In sum, the VSL approach is currently the dominant way of thinking about 
how tort law should assign a dollar sum to a decedent’s hedonic loss. Other 
 
 84. See, e.g., Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation, supra note 31, at 126, 
130–31. 
 85. Andrew J. McClurg, It’s a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 60–61 (1990). 
 86. Id. at 110. 
 87. Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1873, 1921–22 (2006). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Though not attempting to put a dollar sum on hedonic loss, for a discussion of the topic, see, for 
example, Gregory C. Keating, Irreparable Injury and Extraordinary Precaution: The Safety and Feasibility 
Norms in American Accident Law, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2003). 
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approaches exist (for example, those of McClurg and Cross and Silver), but, as 
I have argued, it seems that they are not promising. Further, the VSL approach, 
at the very worst, is on a par with these other approaches. The VSL approach is 
a valiant attempt to do better than the accounts that espouse the use of an 
arbitrary damages sum, and in some ways it indeed is better. VSL is a good step 
forward because, at the very least, it is trying to provide a non-arbitrary way of 
assigning a damages sum to the hedonic loss. Thus, there seems to be good 
reason for the VSL approach being the dominant approach; it is the most 
promising currently available approach. Thus, in the remainder of this Article I 
focus on the VSL approach rather than on any of the other accounts. As I will 
show, however, even though VSL is a better approach than the others that 
currently exist, it too has serious flaws. As I will show, we not only can do better 
than the non-VSL accounts, but we can also do better than the VSL account.  
4. Other Considerations Regarding Whether We Want, and If So 
Whether Monetary Damages Can Effectuate, “Full Compensation” 
Before continuing, I briefly flag considerations and strategies raised by two 
other authors, which will be returned to later in this Article. These 
considerations, raised by Jennifer Arlen and Mark Geistfeld, both pertain not to 
the question of whether VSL is the appropriate measure for determining full 
compensation, but, rather, to broader questions regarding the notion of full 
compensation itself: questions of whether (1) full compensation is something we 
even want (that is, whether we should instead have less than full compensation); 
and (2) whether compensatory damages are capable of being fully 
compensatory, and, if not, how we can remedy this shortfall to provide full 
compensation. 
First, Arlen’s points about full compensation: Arlen argues that while 
damages should be recoverable for the hedonic loss of the decedent, we would 
not want a rule that provides full compensation for a decedent’s hedonic loss.90 
Instead, she argues that we would prefer to live in a society where there is less 
than full compensation for hedonic loss because the prospect of having to be an 
involuntary payer of full compensation for someone else’s life would be too 
burdensome, and this is not something that we would want.91 I flag Arlen’s 
approach here, but I will consider her arguments separately, in Part IV.C.   
Next, Geistfeld’s different point about full compensation: According to 
him, in cases of irreparable harm (of which death is one example), there is a 
“compensatory shortfall”—that is, compensatory damages do not fully or 
sufficiently compensate.92 As a result, in order to bring about greater 
 
 90. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 1127–28, 1135–36; see also Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort 
Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 86–87 (1990). 
 91. Arlen, supra note 90, at 86–87. 
 92. See Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 142; see also Mark A. Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical 
Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 
387, 407 (2014) [hereinafter Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security]; Mark Geistfeld, Placing a 
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compensation and more optimal incentives, we should pursue other avenues—
such as increasing the amount of expenditure on care that we require of potential 
tortfeasors in cases that would result in irreparable harm.93 This expenditure of 
wealth by potential tortfeasors, which would redound to the benefit of potential 
plaintiffs, would, according to Geistfeld, help minimize the “compensatory 
shortfall.”94 Further, and relatedly, Geistfeld argues that, as a result of this 
“compensatory shortfall,” punitive damages play an instrumental role in 
protecting potential plaintiffs’ security and bodily integrity in cases of 
irreparable harms, and thus punitive damages constitute a crucial component of 
our tort system.95 
In addition to these broader questions raised about full compensation by 
Arlen and Geistfeld, recall also that despite being proponents of the VSL 
account, Hersch and Viscusi also articulated views regarding broader questions 
about the notion of full compensation.96 According to them, hedonic loss is not 
something that should be a component of full compensation, and they think that 
we would want recovery in wrongful death suits to be equal to the VSL sum, 
much of which would fall in the category of punitive damages.97 Thus, according 
to them, the appropriate damages measure for wrongful death would be a sum 
that is in excess of full compensation.98 
In sum, in the context of wrongful death, Arlen argues that we should have 
a damages sum that is less than full compensation, Hersch and Viscusi argue 
that we should have a damages sum that is more than full compensation, and 
Geistfeld argues that we should have full compensation, but that a damages sum, 
alone, will not enable us to bring about full compensation, and thus we must 
heighten the amount of care we require of potential tortfeasors so as to lessen 
the compensatory shortfall. 
As will become clear in this Article, I think that all of these authors are 
mistaken. I will show that in the wrongful death context, fully compensatory 
damages, when understood in the correct way,99 (1) contra Arlen, are not too 
high of a damages sum, (2) contra Hersch and Viscusi, are not too low of a 
damages sum, and (3) contra Geistfeld, do not give rise to a “compensatory 
shortfall” that requires us to pursue other avenues to supplement damages to get 
 
Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 
83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 796–803 (1995) (arguing against the reduction of pain-and-suffering damages); Mark 
Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety Matters More than Money, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 141–42 (2001). 
 93. Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 142; Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security, supra note 92, at 
407. 
 94. See Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security, supra note 92, at 407. 
 95. Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 145–46. 
 96. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 12. 
 97. Id. at 231. 
 98. Id. at 232. 
 99. For an explanation of how to understand compensatory damages in the wrongful death context in the 
right way, see infra Part II.B. 
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closer to providing full compensation. Accordingly, in my view, it also is not 
the case that the wrongful death context (or, more generally, the irreparable harm 
context) uniquely100 requires punitive damages.101  
*** 
With these additional considerations in mind, I now return to a discussion 
of VSL. As I have shown, the VSL approach is the dominant approach to 
thinking about how tort law should assign a dollar sum to a decedent’s hedonic 
loss. In what follows, I explain why, in my view, the VSL approach to pricing 
hedonic loss is not the approach we should use. 
II.  MY CONCERNS WITH THE VSL APPROACH 
A. INITIAL INTUITIVE CONCERNS 
The limitations of VSL discussed in Part I.B arguably do not strike the very 
core of the VSL approach. In other words, one might think that these issues do 
not cast doubt on the use of VSL but, rather, that they just point to various ways 
in which we need to tweak or fine-tune VSL. I think that this might be right. I 
do, however, also think that, especially when all of these limitations are taken as 
a whole, the fine-tuning concerns discussed above might indeed be significant 
enough that there is reason to look for something new. I also think, however, 
that even if they are not terrible problems for VSL in and of themselves, they 
might be symptomatic of a more significant problem with the VSL approach: 
the arbitrariness of it—in the sense that what we are measuring is not really what 
we are after. It seems that there is a disconnect between what we are measuring 
and what we are saying that the output is: the dollar value of the 100% chance 
of death. Yes, one could say that by definition there is a gap, because the whole 
point is that we are trying to make a construct because we have a gap that we are 
 
 100. I’m not suggesting that there aren’t reasons for there to be punitive damages in the wrongful death 
context. Indeed, punitive damages might be appropriate in the wrongful death context for the typical reasons 
that punitive damages might be appropriate (for example, the need for extra deterrence because of a non-100% 
detection rate, expressing moral disapproval and blame, and the like). Instead, my point is that the context of 
wrongful death (and of irreparable harm, more generally) does not uniquely require punitive damages, despite 
the arguments of Hersch and Viscusi and of Geistfeld to the contrary. 
 101. Contra Geistfeld, in my view, compensatory damages can indeed avoid a compensatory shortfall. Even 
though they cannot compensate the dead person himself, punitive damages cannot either, and whether the 
decedent himself can be compensated is not the only workable litmus test for whether there is a compensatory 
shortfall. Additionally, appropriately priced compensatory damages can indeed bring about the optimal 
incentives—inducing a sufficient expenditure on care by the potential tortfeasor. Having compensatory damages 
be correctly priced, indeed, would bring about the optimal expenditure on care by the potential tortfeasor, and 
bringing about the optimal expenditure on care is what Geistfeld thinks is needed to supplement compensatory 
damages. In my view, however, this is brought about by having correctly priced compensatory damages. As 
stated in note 100, supra, however, it could be that the typical rationales for punitive damages, if applicable to a 
particular case of wrongful death (or, more generally, irreparable harm) could make it appropriate for there to 
also be punitive damages. This, however, would not be for reasons unique to wrongful death (or, more generally, 
irreparable harm). 
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trying to bridge. But it seems to me that we must be able to do better than this. 
The system seems too arbitrary.  
What is counterintuitive about the problem that we are trying to solve (that 
is, what dollar sum to attribute to the decedent’s hedonic loss) is that people 
would not actually view the extrapolated sum (that is, $9 million) as a sum that 
they would accept for the occurrence of the future bad event. This is unlike the 
case of extrapolation that we do in a typical case where the bad event is 
something other than death. As discussed earlier, in that case we indeed would 
view the extrapolated dollar value as the value one attributes to the future bad 
event; there, we would be indifferent between the bad event occurring but being 
compensated for it, and the bad event not occurring (and thus also not being paid 
any compensation). Not so in the death case. We would prefer to not die than to 
die and have the tortfeasor pay $9 million. This all, of course, is just restating 
the nature of the task that confronts us here, however. Any dollar sum that we 
attribute to the hedonic loss will suffer from this objection. Thus, these 
comments in and of themselves do not show that the VSL account is afflicted by 
a problem that would not also plague any other account. These comments do 
hint at something, though: the seeming arbitrariness of VSL. This arbitrariness 
on its own would not itself be a sufficient reason to reject the VSL approach, 
though, if all possible accounts in this domain would also suffer from the 
arbitrariness concern. It might just be that some arbitrariness in setting the dollar 
sum is a necessary feature of this problem. If, however, I can show that another 
approach does not suffer from arbitrariness, then that would be a reason to prefer 
the other approach to the VSL approach.102  
B. TWO WAYS OF SEEING THAT VSL IS CARRYING OUT THE HAPPINESS-TO-
MONEY TRANSLATION AT THE WRONG JUNCTURE 
Having stated that, intuitively, something seems a bit off and a bit 
unsatisfying about the VSL approach, I now explain more concretely what I take 
to be the problem with the VSL approach. 
If we are to provide a monetary remedy for the loss of happiness to the 
decedent (as I agree we should, so as to bring about optimal deterrence), we will 
at some juncture need to translate the lost happiness into a monetary sum. The 
VSL approach does this, but I think that it does so at the wrong juncture in the 
analysis—namely on the decedent’s utility curve. The following discussions 
will: (1) explain further what I mean by this claim; and (2) explain why I think 
I am right to think that VSL’s translation from happiness to money is occurring 
in the wrong place. I then offer an alternative approach—which carries out the 
happiness-to-money translation on the tortfeasor’s utility curve rather than on 
 
 102. Importantly, however, S&P do not think that the VSL approach is arbitrary. They think that it is a 
principled approach to the topic and that there is good reason to use this as a way to quantify the dollar sum to 
be attributed to the lost life. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 587–92. 
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the decedent’s—and I argue that it is not afflicted by the problems plaguing the 
VSL approach.103  
In what follows, I provide two separate arguments to show that the VSL 
approach is mistaken to carry out the happiness-to-money translation on the 
decedent’s utility curve. First, I show that the phrase “the monetary loss to the 
decedent” (like its closely related variants) has no meaning and therefore cannot 
be the basis for a non-arbitrary answer to the question at hand. Second, I argue 
that the decedent’s wealth is irrelevant to the determination of damages for 
hedonic loss. Using the decedent’s wealth for this calculation is problematic 
from both the backward-looking and the forward-looking perspectives. As will 
become clear, this second point also lays the groundwork for the positive 
proposal that I will present in Part III.  
1. Point 1: The Term “The Monetary Amount of the Loss to the 
Decedent” and Its Variants Lack Meaning  
I have already stated that it does not make sense to speak about the amount 
of money to attribute to the loss to the decedent. And the proponent of VSL 
might likely agree that it sounds a bit odd, since people would not be indifferent 
between dying and being compensated or not dying and not being compensated. 
Although this was more a statement of the problem that VSL seeks to solve than 
a problem with the VSL approach as an attempt to solve it, it does point us to a 
problem with VSL. 
The problem with VSL is not (1) that the person would not be indifferent 
between (a) death and compensation, and (b) no death and no compensation; or 
(2) that the decedent cannot be made whole with the money because he is dead, 
although both of these statements are true and are what make our topic a tricky 
one. Rather, the problem is that it is not even clear that “the monetary amount of 
the loss to the decedent” has a meaning or makes any sense. Contrast this, 
however, with a different notion: “the happiness amount of the loss.” The 
decedent, being dead, of course cannot be compensated either for his loss in 
happiness or his loss in money, but the notion in the context of happiness makes 
sense in a way that the monetary version does not. We can indeed make sense 
of the idea that the decedent, as a result of his death, incurred a loss of happiness. 
He did not, however, incur a loss of money. Thus, the point here is that the phrase 
“the monetary amount of the loss to the decedent” simply does not have a 
meaning. It does not make sense to ask how much of a monetary loss was 
brought about to the decedent by losing out on the years of life that he would 
have had in his future. There simply is no such monetary loss.  
Thus, it seems that part of the problem with the VSL approach is that it 
attempts to put a dollar sum on a concept that has no referent. The seeming 
 
 103. For a discussion of various issues regarding the relevance of defendants’ wealth and whether it should 
be taken into account in determining either the level of due care or the compensatory damage award, see Jennifer 
H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992). 
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arbitrariness and difficulty in finding a satisfying and plausible answer to the 
question of how much that sum should be thus likely is due to a difficulty in 
even articulating the question itself.   
To attempt to articulate these same points but from a slightly different 
angle, there is another (related) way of showing that the VSL approach is 
carrying out the happiness-to-money translation at the wrong juncture (and thus 
the following is another way of pointing to the meaninglessness of “the monetary 
amount of the loss to the decedent”): The decedent lacks a utility curve. He has 
no utility function—in other words, he has no function illustrating the amounts 
of happiness that various amounts of money provide him with. Thus, there is no 
function for him anymore that provides a means to translate monetary sums into 
happiness sums (or which provides us with insight about how to perform that 
translation). And using the utility curve from when he was alive seems arbitrary 
at best.104 Thus, as a result (and to preview the solution I offer below, in Part 
III), we will need to use someone else’s utility curve.  
a. Some Possible Objections (and Responses to the Objections)  
Objection Number 1. One might respond to me as follows, arguing that 
indeed the decedent did incur a loss of money: Perhaps, one might say, the 
decedent has a monetary loss in the sense that he would have accepted money in 
a VSL-type sense in the labor force to incur this risk of death, and, thus, his 
failure to get paid that amount of money for incurring the risk is a way in which 
he was not compensated and in which he incurred a loss. In other words, perhaps 
it would have been a fair deal for him if he had received the $900 and then 
incurred the risk of death, and then had had the death indeed happen. But he did 
not get paid the $900, so he thus had a monetary loss.  
I offer two points in response to this point: First, even if the general point 
just articulated is correct in broad strokes, it still does not give us the result that 
the VSL approach purports to give us. The VSL approach states that the dollar 
value of the loss to attribute to the death is $9 million, but the foregoing thought 
experiment shows, at best, that the decedent’s loss is equal to $900, and not $9 
million. Second, the argument does not even follow with respect to the $900, 
because whether or not the death in fact came to fruition for this decedent is a 
question orthogonal to whether or not he was paid. It might very well be that he 
was already paid $900. If so, then even on this theory he would not be owed 
anything. Further, conversely, if the decedent was exposed to the risk for which 
he should be paid $900, then he should have been paid $900 regardless of 
whether the risk materialized into an actual death for him. Accordingly, the $900 
is not in any sense the monetary loss to the decedent that is brought about by his 
death. This is a second way in which the argument I am responding to here is 
seemingly not a particularly strong one.  
 
 104. See Objection Number 3, below, for further discussion of whether using the utility function from when 
the decedent was alive would be arbitrary. 
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Objection Number 2. Perhaps the VSL proponent could respond that we 
need not refer to the term, “the amount of monetary loss to the decedent,” and 
that we instead could simply refer to the monetary sum as the amount that would 
bring about the correct incentives for future tortfeasors. Thus, the VSL 
proponent might say that I am attacking a straw man, and that he is simply trying 
to find the correct monetary amount for the damages sum. He can say that he 
can just talk about this in more neutral terms, without changing the substance of 
what is being said, and he thus would be able to be immune to the points I make 
here, which he might call “definitional.”   
But it does not seem as though this strategy would work, because it likely 
turns out to be a circular argumentative maneuver. This is because, while we 
could just refer to the monetary sum that would bring about the correct 
incentives for future tortfeasors, it seems that in trying to cash out what that 
amount should be, we would need to say “the amount by which the decedent 
was harmed”—or something along these lines. And when we try to say 
something like that, it seems that we then run into the very problems that we 
were trying to avoid: the problem of being clear about what we even mean by 
that phrase, and the seeming difficulty of providing an understanding of that 
phrase that makes sense. Thus, it seems that the VSL proponent’s attempted 
response does not get him off the hook.  
Thus, to reiterate what I stated above, it seems that part of the problem with 
the VSL approach is that it attempts to put a dollar sum on a concept that has no 
referent (and thus does not even make sense), and the seeming arbitrariness and 
difficulty in finding a satisfying and plausible answer to the question of how 
much that sum should be might be due to a difficulty in even articulating the 
question itself. 
Objection Number 3. In response to my claim that it would be “arbitrary at 
best” to use the utility function that the decedent had when he was alive, one 
might deny this, instead arguing that using the utility function from when the 
decedent was alive would not be arbitrary at all, and that this would indeed be a 
reasonable option. Further, one possible example of how one might say we could 
use the decedent’s utility curve to determine a damages sum is the following: 
Suppose that, using one of the “happiness-aggregation functions” that I 
introduce in Part III, we have a metric for determining the overall amount of 
happiness experienced in a particular life. Perhaps the damages sum (which uses 
the decedent’s utility function) could be the sum of money, which, if, 
counterfactually, had been distributed throughout the years of the shortened life, 
would have resulted in a lifetime that would have contained the same amount of 
happiness as the lifetime without the premature death (and thus without any 
compensation). Or, said differently, suppose that the damages sum is the sum of 
money that a person would accept at the outset of his life (or if choosing between 
possible lives for oneself before one is born) in order to be indifferent between 
the shorter life and the longer life.  
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While this is indeed a way in which we could come up with a damages 
sum, it still does not seem to avoid the concerns that I have been raising. It is 
true that it is not completely arbitrary—after all, the strategy I just laid out does 
follow a formula for determining how to arrive at the appropriate sum—but the 
VSL approach follows a formula as well, and I have argued that it is arbitrary in 
a relevant way. The way in which VSL and the strategy I just laid out are 
arbitrary is that they still do not capture what the loss really is to the decedent, 
yet they purport to be doing so. While it indeed might be true that the sum in the 
strategy I just laid out could be what makes a person indifferent between the two 
possible lives from the start, it still does not seem to speak to how much the 
decedent is harmed by the death.105 
b. Summary Regarding Point 1 
Taking stock: The loss to the decedent can only be quantified in terms of 
happiness and not in terms of money. Thus, it just does not make sense to 
quantify the loss to the decedent in monetary terms; the loss to the decedent is 
not a monetary loss—it is a happiness loss. We cannot translate the loss of 
happiness to a loss of money on his utility curve. 
This does not, however, mean that money cannot be affixed to that hedonic 
sum. (After all, the whole purpose of this Article—and, more generally, the 
debate about hedonic-loss damages—is to figure out how to ultimately fix a 
monetary sum to this happiness sum, so if it were not ever possible, then this 
inquiry would be a failure.) It just means that at this juncture in the analysis there 
 
 105. I here offer an additional objection and response:  
  Objection Number 4. Somewhat related to Objection Number 3, suppose one argues as follows: What 
VSL really is is a way of approaching the question of how a person trades off having additional money during 
the years he lives versus having additional years of life. The VSL approach takes as inputs the trades between 
money and an increase of chance of immediate death by 1/10,000 (which thus amounts to an expected life 
expectancy of 9,999/10,000 of the length of what he would otherwise have expected). Similarly, one could ask 
a person how much he would have to be paid to give up a certain loss of 1/10,000 of his remaining life 
expectancy. Or, similarly, one might ask how much he would have to be paid to give up a certain loss of one 
year of life. Thus, there seems to be nothing wrong with there being evidence (obtained either by asking 
hypothetical questions or by observing decisions that are made) that shows what dollar sum a person would put 
on, say, a year of his life. Perhaps, one might say, even if it does not follow that extrapolating from the dollar 
sum one would accept for one year of life, and multiplying by, say, twenty (if one has twenty years of life left) 
would constitute the loss to the decedent who loses out on his last twenty years of life, perhaps this is the best 
we can do. 
  If one recognizes the acknowledged limitations of this (that is, that it does not actually capture the loss 
to the decedent and is, at best, “the best we can do”), then I do not disagree. And, as I will explain in Part III, I 
agree that data about how people trade off dollars for years of their life is indeed data that we can and should 
use, and I employ a version of this in my positive proposal. I, however, will use this type of data for comparisons 
between dollars and portions of a person’s life that do not constitute the entire remainder of his life. When this 
data is used to put a dollar sum on a loss that is incurred by a decedent by a premature death (that is, when the 
dollar sum is meant to represent the dollar value of a portion of a person’s life that constitutes the entire 
remainder of his life), then I think that a mistake is being made. (If, however, one acknowledges the limitations 
I raise and qualifies this maneuver by saying it’s just “the best we can do,” then I wouldn’t object to this as at 
least a reasonable attempt to make the best of a difficult problem—although, as I will argue in this Article, it 
does not turn out to be even “the best we can do.”). 
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is no grounds for picking any particular sum and for referring to the decedent’s 
loss in monetary terms. At this point, monetary sums could be affixed to the 
happiness loss, but the choice of dollar sum would be arbitrary. His loss must, 
at least at this juncture of the analysis, remain in happiness terms.   
2. Point 2: The Decedent’s Wealth Is Irrelevant for Determining the 
Damages Sum—Both for Backward-Looking and Forward-Looking 
Accounts of Tort Law 
There is a second way in which we can see that the VSL account is carrying 
out the translation from happiness to money at the wrong juncture. Further, it is 
this second way that is the most important one for my purposes. This is because 
it will show more clearly what the precise problem with the location of VSL’s 
carrying out the translation is, and, as a result, will directly lead into my positive 
proposal for an alternative to VSL (which will offer an alternative location for 
the happiness-to-money translation to be carried out).  
The VSL approach derives the value of a statistical life by seeing what 
people pay to avoid risks of death. In regulatory law, it simply comes up with 
one non-individuated VSL sum (for example, approximately $9 million in 
today’s dollars) by averaging across all people in a population (or, rather, the 
sample size of the population that was used for data in any particular study).106 
The regulatory law domain thus makes no attempt to individuate. As S&P say, 
and I agree, a good feature of tort law is that it typically tries to individuate 
remedies to a particular case and its parties.107 Thus, if tort law were to provide 
damages for hedonic loss, it seems that it should individuate in this domain, just 
as in the other domains that tort encounters, and provide an individuated VSL, 
specific to the particular case. In Part IV.B, below, I explore whether we indeed 
would want individuation for hedonic loss, and I explore some related issues.108 
For now, however, I simply assume that, as with other areas of tort law, we want 
the remedies in the context of hedonic loss to be individuated and tailored to the 
parties. 
The way the VSL approach derives the value of the statistical life, of 
course, is by seeing what a person pays or would pay to avoid a risk of death and 
then by extrapolating to arrive at a dollar sum for the entire life. What this means 
is that the dollar sum to be affixed to a particular decedent’s life will be a 
function of many things, but, most notably here, it will be drastically affected by 
the wealth of the decedent. How much money one has will play a huge role in 
determining how much one would be willing to pay (or accept) to avoid (or 
incur) a risk of death.109 At one extreme, someone who is very poor will barely 
be willing to spend anything (and perhaps he will not be willing to spend 
 
 106. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 538. 
 107. Id. at 540. 
 108. See infra Part IV.B. 
 109. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 229. 
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anything) to avoid the small risk of death (and if he has no money at all, he might 
be unable to spend anything to avoid the small risk of death).110 At the other 
extreme, a billionaire might be willing to spend a million dollars (and not a mere 
$900) to avoid a 1/10,000 risk of death.111  
Thus, using the VSL approach gives us the result that someone who is very 
poor (“Poor”) might have a VSL of, say, $100, whereas someone who is very 
rich (“Rich”) might have a VSL of, say, $10 billion. If we have a tort system 
with an individuated approach (as I will argue we should), this would give us 
the result that a potential tortfeasor would only have a cost of $100 if he kills 
Poor, but would have a cost of $10 billion if he kills Rich.  
This is problematic for two reasons: for a backward-looking reason and a 
forward-looking reason. While this Article is focused primarily on the forward-
looking account, I will still briefly discuss the backward-looking reason here. 
And I will also mention the backward-looking reason first, because it is likely 
the one that jumps out to readers first when considering the above example.   
To many readers, the fact that the tortfeasor would only have to pay $100 
if he kills Poor but would have to pay $10 billion if he kills Rich is very unfair. 
It seems that the wealth of the decedent should not be relevant to the 
compensation sum on a backward-looking account. Furthermore, even if we are 
careful in how we describe the sum of money and we make it clear that we are 
not saying that the dollar sum is attempting to put a value or worth on the life 
and thus saying that the values of Rich’s and Poor’s lives differ in some deeper 
sense, it still seems as though the huge disparity in the monetary sum that the 
tortfeasor would have to pay for Rich and Poor would appear unfair. Whether or 
not one thinks that, from the backward-looking perspective, compensation for a 
decedent’s hedonic loss to his estate is desirable, it seems clear that the 
decedent’s wealth is and should be irrelevant to the amount of such 
compensation. If the happiness loss of Rich and Poor was the same, and if the 
purpose of “hedonic loss” damages is to provide compensation to the estates of 
Rich and Poor for their loss of happiness (at least from the perspective of the 
backward-looking lens), then it seems perverse to have the amounts made to the 
two estates to differ—much less for one of the amounts to be $100 and the other 
amount to be $10 billion dollars. On a backward-looking account, the wealth of 
the decedent does not seem relevant to the determination of how much the 
monetary remedy should be for hedonic loss. And this sums up what for many 
readers might be a gut reaction to the unfairness of differing damages sum that 
would be paid to the estates of Rich and Poor for their respective deaths. 
As I have stated, however, the main purpose of this Article is to consider 
the question of damages for hedonic loss through the lens of a “forward-looking” 
approach to tort law. Thus, I now leave aside concerns of equity and focus purely 
on the question from an efficiency standpoint.  
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
May 2021] HEDONIC-LOSS DAMAGES THAT OPTIMALLY DETER 1541 
But this disparity between sums paid to Rich and Poor is also bad from an 
efficiency standpoint. The happiness loss to Rich and Poor (we could stipulate) 
is the same (due perhaps to the same number of expected future years that were 
forgone, with each of the years in Rich’s future containing the same amount of 
happiness as each of the years in Poor’s future), and thus the optimal incentives 
should make it that the same amount of effort is expended by the potential 
tortfeasor to prevent the respective deaths of Rich and Poor. Thus, with the VSL 
approach, according to which the damages to be paid are a function of the 
decedent’s wealth, the killing of Poor might be enormously under-deterred and 
the killing of Rich might be enormously over-deterred.  
In terms of the forward-looking account, what the foregoing shows us is 
that the happiness-to-money translation is happening at the incorrect juncture in 
the investigation of our topic. For the incentives to be optimal, we want the 
potential tortfeasor to internalize the amount of happiness loss that would be 
incurred by the victim. Thus, what we need is for the happiness-loss cost to the 
victim to be borne by the tortfeasor (so that it will be taken into account in the 
tortfeasor’s actions). What this then means is that the tortfeasor should be 
incentivized to expend up to the amount of happiness that would be lost by the 
victim (if he is killed) to prevent this loss of the victim (and these incentives 
would be brought about by forcing the tortfeasor to pay this sum in damages in 
tort). Up to what sum of money would this require the tortfeasor to expend? This 
sum of money would be the sum of money, which, if expended by the tortfeasor 
would cause him to have the happiness loss in question. Thus, what we see here 
is that the happiness-to-money translation should be occurring on the 
tortfeasor’s utility curve. This is importantly different from the VSL approach, 
which uses the victim’s utility curve to translate happiness into money. I will 
return to this in greater depth below.  
In sum, it seems to be a mistake both on a backward-looking account and 
on a forward-looking account for the dollar sum paid by a tortfeasor for the 
decedent’s hedonic loss to at all be a function of the decedent’s wealth. The 
underlying mistake is the same from both perspectives: carrying out the 
happiness-to-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve. This renders the 
compensation dependent on the decedent’s wealth. But the decedent’s wealth 
cannot be relevant to an articulation of her loss from any perspective, because 
(1) the actual loss is in happiness rather than wealth and (2) it cannot be 
translated from happiness to wealth if this translation is carried out on the 
decedent’s utility curve. From the backward-looking perspective, the result is an 
injustice: gross under-compensation of Poor. From the forward-looking 
perspective, it is inefficient: the cost internalized by potential tortfeasors is 
rendered arbitrary and therefore cannot provide optimal incentives. Both 
problems can be avoided by switching to a monetary-loss calculation on the 
tortfeasor’s utility curve.  
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C. SUMMARY 
The proponent of the VSL approach would not deny that happiness is what 
the decedent has lost. He would agree. And then, he would say, he is trying to 
find a way to quantify that loss in terms of dollars. I, too, agree that we need to 
carry out a translation from happiness to dollars. After all, figuring out how best 
to do so indeed is the entire purpose of this Article. In my view, however, the 
problem with the VSL approach is that it carries out the happiness-to-money 
translation at the wrong juncture of the analysis. Instead of carrying out this 
translation on the utility curve of the decedent, we instead should carry out the 
translation somewhere else—namely on the utility curve of the tortfeasor.  
Having identified the problem and alluded to the solution, I now turn to 
offering my proposed alternative to VSL. As I will argue, this proposal is not 
afflicted by the same difficulties that afflict the VSL approach.  
III.  MY ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
This Part elaborates on my proposal, and it further explains how it is not 
afflicted by the problems that I have argued afflict the VSL approach. In 
particular, as I will argue, this proposal is better than the VSL account in two 
key ways—related to the two arguments against VSL raised above. First, and 
most importantly: My account brings about optimal incentives for future 
potential tortfeasors whereas the VSL account brings about suboptimal 
incentives for future potential tortfeasors. Second, talking about the “monetary 
loss of the decedent” in the way that the VSL approach speaks about it does not 
even make theoretical sense, but my account avoids this problem and enables 
us, coherently, to provide a solution to the “infinity problem.”112   
I first elaborate on how my proposal works in theory, and I then explain 
how it works in practice.  
A. MY ACCOUNT 
1. Overview 
As stated above, we can stipulate that the happiness loss to Rich and Poor 
is the same, and thus the optimal incentives should make it that the same amount 
of effort is expended by the potential tortfeasor to prevent the respective deaths 
of Rich and Poor. More specifically, we want the potential tortfeasor to 
internalize the amount of happiness loss that would be incurred by the victim. 
What this then means is that the tortfeasor should be incentivized to expend up 
to the amount of happiness that would be lost by the victim (if he is killed) to 
prevent this loss of the victim, and these incentives would be brought about by 
forcing the tortfeasor to pay this cost as damages in tort. What sum of money 
would this happiness sum amount to? This sum of money would be the sum, 
 
 112. See supra Part I.B. 
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which, expended by the tortfeasor, would cause him to have the happiness loss 
in question. Thus, the happiness-to-money translation occurs on the tortfeasor’s 
utility curve.  
The alternative approach proposed in this Article is outlined as follows:  
Step 1: Determining what the relevant amount of happiness loss is.  
  (A): Determining who the correct person or group of people are for  
  determining happiness loss, and determining whether to use expected or  
   actual loss. 
    (i): Determining who the correct person or group of people are for  
    determining happiness loss.  
    (ii): Determining whether to use expected or actual loss. 
  (B): Determining how much happiness the relevant person or group of  
   people lost. 
   (i): The empirical questions about the relevant person’s (or group of  
   people’s) expected future(s). 
  (ii): The theoretical question about which aggregation mechanism to  
  espouse. 
Step 2: Translating the happiness loss into a dollar-sum loss on the tortfeasor’s 
utility curve. 
2. Details 
The first step in carrying out my theory is to determine what the relevant 
amount of happiness loss of the decedent is (be it (1) an “actual” loss or an 
“expected” loss, and (2) be it a loss to the decedent or a loss to a larger group of 
possible or foreseeable decedents). The second step is to translate this amount 
of happiness loss into a dollar sum of loss on the tortfeasor’s utility curve. Both 
steps will involve a number of sub-steps. 
 
 Step 1: Determining what the relevant amount of happiness loss is. The 
first step is to determine what the relevant amount of happiness loss is. This step 
has a few subsections. The first subsection involves, first, the theoretical step of 
determining whether we want to focus on expected loss or actual loss, and 
second, the empirical step of identifying who the correct person or group of 
people are for determining the happiness loss. The second subsection involves 
identifying how much happiness this person or group of people lost.  
 
 Step 1A: Determining who the correct person or group of people are for 
determining happiness loss, and determining whether to use expected or actual 
loss. 
 
 Step 1.A.i: Since we are considering a forward-looking account, which 
focuses on bringing about optimal incentives for potential tortfeasors, the 
question is whom the tortfeasor knew or had reason to know that he was risking 
harming. In some cases, it might be that there was reason to know that only the 
particular decedent was the one who was being exposed to the risk. If so, then 
the analysis would be about what the loss (be it actual loss or expected loss) was 
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to this specific decedent. If, however, the risk were to a broader group of people, 
then the appropriate determination would be about what the expected happiness 
loss to this broader group of possible victims would be—be it that whole 
population or be it some narrower subset of the population (for example, people 
who fly on planes). (If we are considering a group of people and not just the 
decedent, then we would certainly be using expected loss and not actual loss, 
because there was no actual loss to anyone in the group other than the decedent.) 
Thus, the first task is to determine the relevant person or people to consider the 
happiness loss of. This inquiry will be case-specific and empirical.  
 
 Step 1.A.ii: Next, we must answer the question of whether to use actual or 
expected losses of happiness. In other words, actual loss is the loss of happiness 
that the decedent actually incurred, and the expected loss is the happiness loss 
that the tortfeasor would have had reason to foresee that the decedent would 
incur if he were to die. The determination of whether to use actual or expected 
losses seems to be a theoretical question that, for the most part, is not case-
specific (but, rather, which would be a question of law113), and which involves 
precisifying my account—not resolving specific applications of my account in 
certain cases. As stated above, this question would only arise if we are 
considering only the loss to the victim himself, because if we were considering 
a broader group of “possible victims,” then we would necessarily be taking an 
expected-loss approach and not an actual-loss approach.  
Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether we should use actual loss 
or expected loss. And, furthermore, there might be intermediate positions 
according to which a hybrid position is used. This type of a question arises 
elsewhere in tort law as well: According to the eggshell skull rule, tort 
defendants are typically liable for the amount of actual losses (and not merely 
foreseeable losses) even if the extent of the damages are much greater than 
expected (that is, because the victim has an “eggshell skull”), but in order for the 
defendant to be liable for the actual losses, the type of injury must have been 
foreseeable.114 The context here in this Article could import a type of distinction 
similar to that which is used in the eggshell skull rule, but other options are 
possible as well.  
It seems to me that, consistent with the notion of basing damages on facts 
about the tortfeasor (for example, his financial position, his mental state, his 
incentives and cost-benefit analyses, and so on), we should probably focus on 
 
 113. See generally Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1994). 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 539–40.  
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expected losses and not on actual losses.115 And, going forward, this will be the 
assumption I make (though I will often refer, simply, to “losses”).116   
 
 Step 1B: Determining how much happiness the relevant person or group 
of people lost. Having determined which person or group of people are the 
relevant ones for determining the happiness loss and having determined whether 
to use expected or actual loss, the next question is to determine how great the 
happiness loss (or expected happiness loss) would be for this person (or group 
of people). This task itself involves a few nested subsections. Step 1Bi addresses 
empirical questions and Step 1Bii addresses a theoretical question. 
 
 Step 1Bi: The empirical questions about the relevant person’s (or group of 
people’s) expected future(s). First, we need to make empirical estimates about 
the person’s future. We need to estimate both how many years of life the person 
would have lived if not for the tort, and we need to estimate how happy these 
years would have been for the person.  
For the former question, we can rely on information about the person’s age 
and data on life expectancies in the population. This analysis can then be tailored 
more specifically to this person, first by considering generic categories such as 
whether the person is male or female, but also by considering information about 
his health that we might know, and so on.  
With respect to this question of determining how many years of life the 
decedent would have lived if not for the premature death, my view is that courts 
should employ a rebuttable presumption that the number of years that the 
decedent would have lived is equal to the life expectancy in the United States 
for a person of the decedent’s sex minus his or her current age. This estimate 
could then be rebutted by evidence that the parties introduce. In implementing 
my proposal there will then be questions that would need to get ironed out by 
courts regarding how demanding of an evidentiary burden parties would be 
required to meet in their attempts to rebut the presumption.117 
As for the question of how happy these years would have been, we can 
explore (1) data about how happy this particular individual had been, (2) data on 
typical trajectories of people’s happiness over various ages, and then (3) any 
information about how and why we could expect this person’s future happiness 
to conform or not conform to that typical trajectory. Further, if we are going to 
 
 115. It’s important to note that even though I have distinguished between actual loss and expected loss, in 
reality both are types of expected loss, because we cannot know the future. Notwithstanding this wrinkle, I will 
still refer to these two as “actual loss” and “expected loss.” 
 116. This approach has the further benefit that the same approach can be used in the context of focusing on 
just the decedent as well as focusing on a broader group of possible victims for the determination of happiness 
loss—whereas were we to use actual losses in the context of just the decedent, we would still have to use the 
expected losses approach if we were focusing on a group of possible victims. 
 117. Though the question of how demanding of a burden should be employed by the courts for rebutting the 
presumption is an important one and also an interesting one, I do not address this question here. 
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attempt to quantify a person’s happiness, based on the type of information just 
described, we will of course need to articulate a metric, or a unit, of happiness. 
I have discussed this topic at length elsewhere,118 but my view is that the 
seeming difficulty of quantifying happiness, and also the lack of a particular 
metric that we currently use, does not pose a problem here. We could use a 
variety of possible measures that could do the work we need it to, and certain 
measures, such as the “quality-adjusted life-year” (QALY), have been 
suggested.119  
With respect to this “future wellbeing quantification” prong of the analysis, 
my view is that here, too, the courts can make use of a rebuttable presumption. 
In particular, one way to administer this prong of my proposal would be to use 
a wellbeing quantification scale according to which one’s wellbeing ranges 
anywhere from a “1” to a “5,” where “1” means “having an extremely small 
amount of happiness,” “2” means “having a smaller than average amount of 
happiness,” “3” means “having an average amount of happiness,” “4” means 
“having a larger than average amount of happiness,” and “5” means “having an 
extremely large amount of happiness.” As for the rebuttable presumption, it 
would be that the decedent’s future years would have been at a level 3. As was 
the case for the rebuttable presumption in the context of life expectancy, this 
estimate could then be rebutted by evidence that the parties introduce. In 
implementing my proposal, there will then be questions that would need to get 
ironed out by courts regarding how demanding of an evidentiary burden parties 
would be required to meet in their attempts to rebut the presumption.120 
 
 Step 1Bii: The theoretical question about which aggregation mechanism to 
espouse. After having established how many years the person was expected to 
have lost and how much happiness was expected to be contained in those years, 
the next key step in determining how much happiness was lost by the person is 
to determine which “aggregation function” (or “aggregation mechanism”) we 
think is the relevant one for determining what the happiness amount is for that 
whole chunk of years, given the inputs that we have already determined 
quantities for. While some might think that the value of the happiness of the 
 
 118. See Michael Pressman, Calculating Compensation Sums for Private Law Wrongs: Underlying 
Imprecisions, Necessary Questions, and Toward a Plausible Account of Damages for Lost Years of Life, 53 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 597 (2020). 
 119. The QALY is a measure of quality and quantity of life. For early proponents of the measure, see, for 
example, Herbert E. Klarman, John O’S. Francis & Gerald D. Rosenthal, Cost Effectiveness Analysis Applied to 
the Treatment of Chronic Renal Disease, 6 MED. CARE 48 (1968); Sol Fanshel & J.W. Bush, A Health-Status 
Index and Its Application to Health-Services Outcomes, 18 OPERATIONS RSCH. 1021 (1970); George W. 
Torrance, Warren H. Thomas & David L. Sackett, A Utility Maximization Model for Evaluation of Health Care 
Programs, 7 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 118 (1972); Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving 
Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1976). 
 120. Similarly, in the case of this rebuttable presumption, though the question of how demanding of a burden 
should be employed by the courts for rebutting the presumption is an important one and also an interesting one, 
I do not address this question here. 
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whole future equals the sum of the value of each year in the future, thus 
espousing a sum-aggregative aggregation mechanism, this is not the only 
possible approach. On the other end of the spectrum would be an averaging view 
according to which, for example, the happiness of the future is equal to the 
average happiness of each of the future years. Additionally, one could espouse 
hybrid views that give some weight to quantity of years and to quality of years. 
Determining which aggregation mechanism to espouse is a challenging task, 
which I explore in depth elsewhere,121 and there are strong reasons for and 
against the various possible views. Choosing an aggregation mechanism to 
espouse, however, whichever it might be, is a crucial step in determining how 
much expected happiness the person lost. It might seem prima facie, however, 
as though it does not matter which aggregation mechanism we choose because 
it might appear that the different accounts would simply be different ways of 
describing the same data and that they would not result in different prescriptions. 
As we will see, this indeed might be the case if the expected number of years 
lost by the decedent were equal to the expected number of years that the 
tortfeasor has left to live, but if this is not the case, then the different aggregation 
mechanisms would indeed result in different prescriptions on my account.122 
Further, since in most cases the expected loss of years of the decedent will not 
be identical to the expected number of years remaining in the tortfeasor’s life, 
the choice of aggregation mechanism will almost always affect the prescriptions 
on my account. Thus, it indeed is crucial to articulate which aggregation 
mechanism is most plausible.  
 
 Step 2: Translating the happiness loss into a dollar-sum loss on the 
tortfeasor’s utility curve. At this point we will have come to a determination of 
how much happiness was lost. The next step is to determine how much of a 
monetary loss to the tortfeasor would bring about a happiness loss of this amount 
to him.  
I first address how, in theory, this might work. Next, I provide more details 
about how we could carry this out in practice.  
As for how, in theory, we should strive to arrive at the correct dollar sum: 
To consider this question, we will explore questions similar to those that we 
explored in attempting to determine the decedent’s happiness loss. For one, we 
will import our determination of which aggregation mechanism we find most 
 
 121. See Michael Pressman, Aggregating Happiness: A Framework for Exploring Compensation for Lost 
Years of Life, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 875 (2020). 
 122. The reason for this is that that if the expected length of the forgone future of the decedent is a different 
from the expected length of the remaining life of the tortfeasor, then this is an example of what I call a “different-
numbers case.” For detailed discussions of “different-numbers cases” and the difficulties associated with 
satisfactorily resolving them, see Pressman, supra note 118, and Pressman, supra note 121. 
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plausible.123 Next, we will explore the same types of information about the 
tortfeasor as we did about the decedent in our inquiry into determining the 
amount of his happiness loss. For example, for one, we will consider how many 
years left we expect the tortfeasor to have in his life. Thus, suppose, for example, 
that we espouse a sum-aggregative aggregation function and that we determined 
that the decedent’s expected loss was sixty units of happiness (twenty years of 
life of a happiness level of 3). Now suppose that the tortfeasor’s expected future 
is fifty years long. If so, we would want to distribute the sixty-unit loss across 
those fifty years, and we thus would strive to impose on the tortfeasor a loss of 
1.2 units of happiness per year. If, on the other hand, we espoused an averaging 
view in a case with these same facts, we then, instead, might strive to lower the 
tortfeasor’s happiness level by three units per year.124   
The next key task in exploring information about the tortfeasor is to infer 
what his utility curve would look like. In other words, we attempt to determine 
how much of a monetary loss would bring about the particular happiness loss 
we are striving to inflict on him. In order to determine this, various things could 
be relevant—most importantly, the tortfeasor’s wealth. This is because people 
typically have diminishing marginal utility of wealth125 and we can make 
generalizations about the person’s utility function (for example, what the slope 
of the curve is at the current moment) based on his wealth. We could thus create 
a master function, based on empirical studies, which could serve as a default 
utility-to-money translation table. This essentially would amount to a typical 
function of this sort across all people in the population (that is, averaging across 
all possible dispositions (note that this is not averaging across different wealth 
levels126)).  
This, in theory, is what we should be attempting to do. As for how, in 
practice, to carry this out, I propose the following. And, as with my suggestion 
for how to carry out the determination of how much happiness was lost by the 
decedent, the following determination involves the use of rebuttable 
presumptions. Also, the reader should be forewarned that, in the following 
explanation, it will seem as though I am employing VSL—the very notion that 
I have been decrying the use of! Bear with me for a few short paragraphs and I 
 
 123. In my view, this is something that should remain constant in our analysis and should not be person-
specific. One could, however, argue that this too should be person-specific, but I will assume for our purposes 
that it is held constant. 
 124. Note that, as I discuss elsewhere, see Pressman, supra note 121, there are different versions of 
averaging views. 
 125. For an early discussion of this phenomenon, see JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 804 (W.J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green 
& Co. 1909) (1848). 
 126. Note that this is not averaging across different wealth levels in the population. Different wealth levels 
constitute different points on the x-axis. Rather, the curve that I’m suggesting we use would be one that averages 
across the utility curves of all people, where each person’s utility curve shows what their utility would be for 
each possible wealth amount that they might have. Thus, for the purposes of creating this averaging curve, it is 
not relevant what amount of wealth any particular person actually has. 
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will then explain why my usage of VSL in this context (when exploring the 
tortfeasor) is not problematic. (Also, as I will show, there also is an additional 
version of the below approach that I think is slightly better and that also does 
not rely on the same data.) 
The question here is what dollar sum would bring about a loss to the 
tortfeasor of the “happiness amount” that was lost by the decedent. Here I 
suggest we use as a benchmark an individuated VSL sum for the tortfeasor: We 
currently have a VSL sum (circa $9 million) that averages across the whole 
population. Using the same data, if we took note of wealth and, say, age of 
people in the studies, we could obtain more fine-grained VSL data that is a 
function of wealth and age. Then, in order to determine which portion of the data 
corresponds to this tortfeasor, we could have presumptions that (1) the number 
of years of life that the tortfeasor has left is equal to typical life expectancy for 
a person of his or her sex in the United States minus his or her age, and that (2) 
he or she is of average happiness (that is, at a level 3). Again, these presumptions 
would be rebuttable. Then, suppose that, using the individuated VSL data, we 
were to get the result that the tortfeasor’s VSL is, say, $20 million. Suppose 
further that the presumptions are un-rebutted and we have the finding that he has 
twenty years of average happiness left. We then can attribute a dollar sum to a 
year of average happiness: $1 million. If the decedent lost, say, thirty such years, 
we can then arrive at a dollar sum to be paid by the tortfeasor for the hedonic 
loss: $30 million.127 
Here, however, the reader might be surprised to see my suggestion that we 
use the VSL framework, since I have been arguing against this framework. 
Despite appearances to the contrary, however, my usage of the VSL framework 
in this context does not run afoul of the points that I have made in this Article 
up until now. Here is why:  
In the context of the usage of VSL on the decedent’s utility curve, those 
who espouse the VSL approach take as an input what people would pay/accept 
to avoid/incur an increased chance of death of 1/10,000, and then they infer a 
dollar sum to be attributed to the full loss of life. What I have objected to is the 
inference that a dollar sum can be attributed to the full life. In the context here, 
however, I am instead using the VSL data to make inferences from the dollar 
sum attributable to an increased chance of death of 1/10,000 to the dollar sum 
attributable to the loss of, say, 1/20 of one’s future twenty years of life. (I did 
refer to the VSL of $20 million, but what I was really doing was going from a 
dollar valuation of a risk to a dollar valuation of a finite portion of one’s expected 
future, and I was referring to the VSL as shorthand to help make the calculation 
 
 127. If the presumption of a happiness level of 3 is rebutted and shown to be, say, a 4, there certainly will 
be questions about how much of a dollar shift this would entail. This type of imprecision, however, does not 
seem to be different in kind from types of determinations that get made in compensating for non-economic harms 
in cases that do not involve death. Thus, although there would not be perfect precision, I think that this does 
constitute a tractable framework. 
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clearer.) Although the various “non-fatal” and “fine-tuning” concerns with the 
VSL approach apply here, the gripes that I myself raised do not afflict this type 
of an inference about trading money for life-years (when the life-years do not 
constitute one’s entire future). Thus, I do think that this approach can be used to 
develop a benchmark for trading off money for life-years.  
Despite the fact that, in my view, this type of usage of the VSL framework 
is workable for establishing a benchmark in this context, I think that we can do 
better. The VSL strategy that uses as data what people are willing to accept/pay 
for the incurring/avoiding the increased chance of death of 1/10,000 is 
susceptible to the various fine-tuning concerns addressed in Part I.B.128 Many of 
these can be avoided if we instead use the following approach to this data: A 
better benchmark can be reached on the tortfeasor’s utility curve by, instead of 
using labor force and consumption decision data about what people would 
pay/accept to avoid/incur an increased chance of death of 1/10,000, instead using 
the results of surveys of what people (of various ages and with various amounts 
of wealth, and so on) would pay/accept for an increase or decrease of one’s life 
by one year, and then extrapolate from this sum to determine the benchmark on 
the tortfeasor’s utility curve. Although this would be dealing with hypotheticals 
rather than seeing how people indeed make decisions in these situations, this 
data would be better because it would directly address cases of certain loss of a 
period of one’s future, rather than cases of a percent risk of a full loss of life. 
This approach would thus much more directly and accurately help us determine 
(or estimate) how much money a person would accept for the loss of happiness 
of a year of life. To be clear, however, this questionnaire-based suggestion of 
mine would still amount to an exploration of how people trade off dollars versus 
life-years (quality versus quantity of life), and it thus is of the same general type 
of approach as the VSL-based approach to getting a benchmark, and thus this 
just amounts to a way of tweaking the benchmark. But I do think that this would 
be an improvement over the VSL-based benchmark. And, further, even the VSL-
based benchmark discussed here does not, in my view, fall prey to the arguments 
against the standard usage of VSL that I have made throughout the Article up 
until here.  
In sum, using the framework articulated here and making the presumptions 
described—unless successfully rebutted by the parties—would enable us to 
determine what dollar sum in damages would bring about a loss in wellbeing to 
the tortfeasor that would equal the wellbeing loss that the decedent incurred as 
a result of his or her premature death. To the extent that any of the presumptions 
 
 128. See supra Part I.B. 
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are successfully rebutted by evidence introduced by the parties, the appropriate 
dollar sum for damages should then be adjusted accordingly.129130  
This is the sketch of how my proposal works. There are of course additional 
questions about aspects of how this will be implemented. I address some of these 
questions below in Part IV.131  
B. MORE IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS AND SOME BLUEPRINTS FROM OTHER 
AREAS OF THE LAW 
This Subpart further addresses the question of what reforms I am 
advocating for in order to implement my account. The main general reform I am 
advocating for, of course, is that the damages sum for decedents’ hedonic losses 
be determined in the way that I have articulated. But this will involve changes 
to how a few different topics are handled by the legal system, and then, within 
each topic, there will be a variety of specific reforms needed. 
As for which topics will need to be handled differently, the two main ones, 
which are described separately in what follows, are: (1) the relevance of, and 
inquiry into, the defendant’s wealth; and (2) the relevance of, and inquiry into, 
facts about the happiness and mental life of both parties (and often of broader 
groups of individuals in society, be it the entire population or some smaller 
subset thereof).  
Although changes will indeed need to be made in both domains, in neither 
domain are the new procedures ones that are entirely new to the law as a whole. 
In both contexts, there are other areas of the law to which we can turn for 
guidance and for a blueprint of how to carry out reform in this area of the law. 
This is particularly the case in the context of the relevance of the defendant’s 
wealth to damages. Here we can learn a lot from the treatment of this issue in 
the context of punitive damages. In the context of inquiring into happiness, 
although there is not a single analogous domain that currently implements the 
changes I advocate for, we can learn somewhat from a number of areas, 
including our current treatment in tort of cases of non-economic damages.  
 
 129. To the extent the reader is concerned about the lack of perfect precision in translating wellbeing loss 
into a dollar sum, the reader should note that this is not a concern that uniquely afflicts my approach here. This 
precision is also lacking in any award of non-economic damages—even in cases that do not involve death: 
Similarly, in non-death cases of non-economic damages, there is far from a precise science about how translate 
lost wellbeing into money, and we simply try to determine what sum of money would bring about the particular 
gain or loss of wellbeing (which in a non-death non-economic damages case would be trying to put the plaintiff 
back on his original indifference curve). 
 130. Further information could also perhaps be introduced in order to depart from the calculation described, 
though there could perhaps be limitations on additional data to be introduced, and even if additional data could 
be introduced, there could perhaps be a demanding standard making it difficult to rebut the standard 
presumptions. 
 131. There are also, however, some theoretical objections that one might have. For one, one might think that 
the happiness of one person cannot be compared to that of another. While I think that it’s hard to make 
comparisons in this domain with precision, I do think that the endeavor is still a workable one. I consider this 
topic further elsewhere. See Pressman, supra note 118. 
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This is not to say that novel and complex issues of implementation and 
administration will not arise in the current context, but it does mean that in 
implementing these changes we will not be starting from scratch.  
Within the contexts of (1) the relevance of, and inquiry into, the 
defendant’s wealth; and (2) the relevance of, and inquiry into, the happiness and 
mental life of both parties and possibly people in the broader population, various 
specific changes will need to be made. Although these proposals for changes 
will take various forms, the vast majority of them will be directed at judges. In 
the vast majority of cases, the place for the changes to be made is likely in jury 
instructions—with various additions and subtractions being needed. This is 
because in most of these instances, the relevant changes are within the judge’s 
discretion. In other instances, however, it might be less clear whether a change 
is within the judge’s discretion, and the change might require prior conclusions 
as a matter of law. In some (though not all) of even these instances, however, 
the appropriate conclusion as a matter of law might be a function of the judge’s 
determinations about the merits of my account. In some situations, however, the 
implementation of aspects of my account might require changes to be made by 
actors other than judges. For example, these changes could take the form of a 
change to a rule of evidence. Furthermore, in some instances, legislative changes 
might either be required or, even if not required, it might be the best option so 
as to bring about greater uniformity in the practices of individual judges.  
For all of these considerations of what gear in the legal machinery must 
carry out a particular change, and whether a particular change is required, the 
answers will, of course, often vary by jurisdiction.  
1. The Relevance of, and Inquiry into, a Defendant’s Wealth  
My account introduces a few moving parts, and one of these is the 
relevance of a defendant’s wealth for the damages sum representing the 
decedent’s hedonic loss. This, however, is not a completely new type of concept 
that the courts would have to adopt. (And, importantly, note that it is also the 
case that on an individuated VSL account, one party’s wealth would be relevant 
as well—albeit the wealth of the decedent rather than that of the defendant—so 
it too would have this feature.) Although a defendant’s wealth typically is not 
admissible for the determination of damages, there is a context in which the 
defendant’s wealth typically is admissible for the determination of damages: 
punitive damages award determinations.  
Further, and as I will also mention in Part IV.C, below, there are also 
various ways in which states place certain restrictions on punitive damages 
sums.132 For instance, some states place limits on the size of the punitive 
damages award, and in California, for example, some courts have limited 
punitive damages so that they are not greater than ten percent of a defendant’s 
 
 132. See infra Part IV.C. 
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net worth.133 There is, however, an ongoing debate about whether punitive 
damages calculations should consider the wealth of the defendant, and about 
various related sub-issues.134 In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has required punitive damages sums to bear certain relationships to 
compensatory damages sums—requiring, as a general rule (though there indeed 
are exceptions), that the punitive damages sum not be greater than nine times the 
compensatory damages sum, and holding that punitive damages sums exceeding 
this ratio violate due process.135  
In sum, both because a defendant’s wealth can be relevant in the context of 
punitive damages, and because of the various details about how courts have 
addressed various restrictions on the size of punitive damages awards and other 
details about what sums for punitive damages can be proper, the context of 
punitive damages can be used as a blueprint for how a defendant’s wealth can 
be used in the context of damages awards for a decedent’s hedonic loss. Further, 
and as I will also address in Part IV.C, because in the context of punitive 
damages there have been restrictions on the amount of damages, if we were to 
determine that in the hedonic-loss context we similarly would want to have 
certain reductions and restrictions on damages, this is another way in which the 
punitive damages context could be helpful in providing a blueprint for the 
context of hedonic-loss damages. 
Thus, in determining the procedures and practices regarding how to have 
the damages sum be a function of the defendant’s wealth (and also in considering 
various concerns that might arise in doing so136), we can look to the punitive-






 133. Storage Servs. v. Oosterbaan, 262 Cal. Rptr. 689, 700–01 (Ct. App. 1989); Michelson v. Hamada, 36 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 359 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 134. See Leila C. Orr, Making a Case for Wealth-Calibrated Punitive Damages, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1739, 
1770 (2004); Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J. 927, 928–29 (2008). 
But see Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of 
Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415–16 (1989) (arguing that defendant’s wealth is irrelevant to the 
goal of deterring socially undesirable conduct and thus should not be considered in assessing punitive damages). 
 135. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003); see also BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581–82 (1996); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352–53 (2007). 
 136. While various potential problems could arise when courts (and juries) consider a defendant’s wealth to 
be relevant for the determination of damages, once such potential problem is the concern that juries might use 
information about defendants’ wealth in impermissible ways. For example, juries might be tempted to make the 
deep-pocketed defendant pay a large sum in damages just because he can, and the jury might be seeking to do 
what in their view might be furthering distributive justice in society. This concern and a variety of related ones 
are serious and must be carefully guarded against.  There are, however, ways in which the law deals with these 
types of concerns, and in my view, these are probably sufficient. Once again, we can look to the context of 
punitive damages for guidance both regarding possible problems to watch out for and, also, regarding possible 
solutions to these problems. 
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2. Relevance of, and Inquiry into, the Happiness and Mental Life of the 
Parties (and Possibly of Others) 
The second key area of change required by my account in order for the 
appropriate analysis to be carried out is for various forms of happiness data to 
be taken into account in determining the damages sum—and thus for this data 
to be introduced into evidence. We will need to obtain data in some cases about 
the expected future happiness of the specific decedent, and in other cases this 
same data for broader groups of the population. Similar data will need to be 
obtained for the tortfeasor.  
Additionally, determinations will need to be made about which aggregation 
mechanism (for aggregating happiness across years of a life) is the most 
plausible, and there are various ways in which juries or courts can come to 
determinations about this. First of all, this determination could be left to the 
judge. Second, it could be left for the jury to determine, and, if so, there could 
be a wide range of guidance or non-guidance that they could receive in jury 
instructions (not only in terms of how restrictive or non-restrictive the jury 
instructions are regarding requiring certain conclusions about the aggregation 
mechanism, but also in terms of how much or little non-binding and simply 
helpful guidance the court provides in the jury instructions). Additionally, 
questions arise about the details of what aspects of these topics can be testified 
to by expert witnesses.  
While ironing out the details of how courts can and should determine the 
answers to a number of these procedural questions is beyond the scope of this 
Article,137 the key areas of change here, as with the topic of the defendant’s 
wealth, are areas that are largely within the discretion of the judge, and thus the 
reform proposals are primarily directed to judges. As with the topic of the 
defendant’s wealth, however, there might be some reform proposals directed 
toward those writing the rules of evidence and, in some cases, the target of the 
proposals might be the legislature—either because this would be necessary or 
because the uniformity it would effectuate would be desirable.  
C. SUMMARY  
The VSL approach carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the 
decedent’s utility function. My account, on the other hand, which this Part has 
provided a sketch of, carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the 
tortfeasor’s utility function. Arguing for the shift of the happiness-to-money 
translation onto the tortfeasor’s utility curve is the key move of this Article. In 
my view, the proposal that I offer has two key advantages over the VSL approach 
(and avoids falling prey to the problems I raised for the VSL approach): (1) It 
brings about optimal incentives for potential tortfeasors, since it forces them to 
 
 137. I tackle these and related questions in my article, The Relevance of Defendants’ Wealth for Forward-
Looking, Backward-Looking, and Mixed Accounts of Tort Damages. See Pressman, supra note 17. 
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internalize the actual loss to the decedent; and (2) it avoids the incoherence 
problem faced by the VSL account, which must rely on the meaningless concept 
of “monetary loss to the decedent.” 
Note, however, that at this point it would be premature to declare that my 
proposal is superior to the VSL approach. This is for two reasons. First, I have 
not yet engaged with Arlen’s arguments (mentioned in Part I.C)138, and I have 
not yet explained how and why my proposal is immune to her important points. 
Second, I have not yet raised and considered a variety of other possible 
considerations and objections that probe the plausibility and viability of my 
proposal. In Part IV, I will carry out both of these tasks—thus providing further 
clarification of my proposal and providing a more robust defense of my 
proposal.  
Before doing so, however, I first briefly explain that my proposal has 
implications that extend far beyond the context of cases involving death. Indeed, 
my proposal has implications for all of tort law, more generally, and even for 
various areas of the law outside of tort law. In particular, my arguments here, if 
persuasive, threaten some of the foundational assumptions of the law-and-
economics literature and the willingness-to-pay literature. I address these 
extensions in detail elsewhere,139 but here I just briefly mention the broader 
implications that my proposal in this Article has:  
Up until now, I have been discussing my positive proposal in the context 
of providing a remedy to wrongful-death plaintiffs for decedents’ hedonic loss. 
While this context indeed is my primary focus in this Article, my positive 
proposal’s claims about (1) optimal (forward-looking) incentives being brought 
about by damages rules that require tortfeasors to internalize the happiness cost 
that their activities impose on others; and (2) the relevance of using the 
tortfeasor’s utility curve, are also intended to apply, much more broadly, to tort 
law on the whole (and beyond tort to other areas of the law). In order for tort law 
to bring about optimal incentives, tort damages should always require tortfeasors 
to internalize the happiness costs that their activities impose on others, and 
translating happiness to money on the defendant’s utility curve is of key 
importance in doing so. This is a normative claim. The law, I argue, should do 
this if it wants to bring about optimal incentives going forward for potential 
tortfeasors. I also, however, in part provide a descriptive version of this claim: I 
argue that in most—though, not in all—non-death situations, the damages 
measure in tort that is currently used is indeed both consistent with and 
ultimately rooted in the rationales behind these arguments of mine.  
This descriptive claim may seem surprising, and that is because, as I show 
elsewhere,140 in most cases it seems that tort law does not use the defendant’s 
utility curve, and it instead typically uses the plaintiff’s utility curve. (Indeed, 
 
 138. See supra Part I.C. 
 139. See Pressman, supra note 17. 
 140. Id. 
1556 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1511 
the ubiquity of using the plaintiff’s utility curve is the reason why it was assumed 
by proponents of VSL, and seemingly everyone else, that we must use the 
plaintiff’s utility curve in our attempt to determine the damages sum to attribute 
to plaintiffs’ hedonic loss in wrongful death suits.) I show why it is that we 
typically use the plaintiff’s utility function in determining a damages sum, and 
why this common way of determining damages is not inconsistent with my 
theory. I also, however, show that there are some situations in which using the 
plaintiff’s utility function is not consistent with my theory, and I argue that in 
these situations it is our practices that should be revised. 
Thus, interestingly, while I had set out to provide a plausible account of 
what dollar sum for hedonic-loss damages in wrongful-death suits would 
provide optimal incentives going forward for future potential tortfeasors, it turns 
out that exploring this context enables us to learn something more fundamental 
about tort law on the whole (as well as about other areas of the law, and about 
core principles underlying law-and-economics theory). This more fundamental 
insight was previously obscured in non-death contexts.141   
IV.  A CLARIFICATION AND CONSIDERING FOUR OBJECTIONS 
This Part considers and responds to a number of objections to my proposal 
(that is, my main proposal for damages in death cases). First, however, I discuss 
a key point of clarification. This point of clarification will tie into aspects of a 
number of the objections I raise in this Part, and it will serve as a preemptive 
partial response to aspects of these objections.  
Although my account in theory states that the most efficient results will be 
brought about by calculating compensation for decedents’ hedonic loss in 
wrongful-death cases by using the defendant’s utility curve, there will likely be 
various efficiency considerations in practice that cut in other directions. We must 
take into account people’s tastes for fairness (which could be at odds with the 
prescriptions of the Hand Theorem142) and other preferences that people might 
have and take these at face value and treat them as fixed; we must consider 
various considerations of administrability; and we must consider various 
incentive effects. All of these factors might render it more efficient in certain 
cases to employ a VSL account that makes the happiness-to-money translation 
on the decedent’s utility curve, or to employ something wholly different from 
the account that I have proposed. Thus, even on my account, there might be good 
 
 141. If my arguments on non-death cases are successful, they not only provide support for my claims about 
tort law on the whole, but they will also reinforce my arguments specifically in the context of death. After all, 
support for my theory broadly construed is also support for one of its specific applications—namely, the context 
of hedonic-loss damages in wrongful-death suits. 
 142. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). According to Learned 
Hand’s famous formula (“The Hand Theorem”), a party has breached his duty of reasonable care when the 
burden of taking a precaution to prevent a loss is less than the loss multiplied by the probability of the loss 
occurring absent the precaution being taken. Hence, Hand’s Theorem is represented mathematically as B = P * 
L, where the duty has been breached when the precaution is not taken, and B is less than P * L. Id. 
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reason to adopt VSL in some (or possibly, it could turn out, even in all) cases. 
This will not render my proposal less correct, and it likely would not even reduce 
its value much.143 Thus, regardless of how the theoretical and practical 
efficiency considerations end up weighing against each other on net, my 
proposal and arguments will still remain valuable. Although I have not said here 
whether I think my account is still efficient in practice—and although an 
empirical analysis of that question is beyond the scope of this Article—I will 
argue, in Part V, that my account is almost certainly more efficient in practice 
than the alternatives, just as it is in theory.  
As we will see, a number of the objections I will raise in this Part will be 
related to this pre-emptive clarification.   
A. OBJECTION 1: WHY SHOULD WE INDIVIDUATE? 
Objection 1 comes in two subparts: 1a and 1b.  
Objection 1a: Why do we want individuation? In arguing that there was a 
problem with the VSL approach, one of your main points was to argue that VSL 
was bad because damages awards for hedonic loss would vary dramatically 
based on the wealth of the decedent, potentially enabling Rich to receive billions 
of dollars from a tortfeasor while Poor might receive one hundred dollars from 
the tortfeasor, while we could stipulate that the hedonic loss to both Rich and 
Poor was the same. Why is the solution not simply to use a uniform VSL sum, 
which takes the average VSL value in the population as a whole and uses that 
for all decedents regardless of how wealthy or poor they are? Since this resolves 
one of your primary criticisms of VSL, perhaps we need not abandon it after all.   
Objection 1b: Relatedly, but more generally: Why do we want 
individuation in the tort system in the first place?  
Before addressing this objection, I first mention a key point to keep in 
mind: This objection is about what would in theory be efficient. Thus, it does 
not matter here whether, for considerations of administrability or other practical 
reasons, we want an individuated tort system or not. For the reasons stated in the 
clarification at the beginning of Part IV, it is consistent with my account that we 
would in some situations—or even in all situations—ultimately determine it 
maximally efficient, in practice, to not individuate. The question here, however, 
instead is about whether individuation is theoretically desirable. 
Having said this, I now answer Objections 1a and 1b (in reverse order).  
 
 143. If it turns out that even in practice, my account should be implemented in all or most cases, that is 
extremely valuable. But even if it turns out to only be in a very small number of cases that it should, in practice, 
be implemented, this too would still be valuable. Further, even if it turns out that my proposal should never, in 
practice, be implemented, the proposal is still valuable. This is for two reasons: (1) It might turn out there are 
other sub-areas in the law where applying my proposal would indeed prescribe changes, so it is useful to become 
clear on it in theory even in the context I discussed; and (2) even if there were no other areas where my account 
would prescribe change, it still would be valuable to arrive at an accurate understanding of why it is that the 
current state of the law is what it is, and according to my proposal, we have at the very least been operating 
under a misunderstanding regarding the rationale for the current state of the law. 
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Response to Objection 1b: In my view, the ideal indeed is for the results of 
a case to be perfectly tailored to the litigants in the case. Why? This is a notion 
that sits at the core of tort law. And for good reason. Leaving aside questions of 
administrability, why would we ignore more information that could bring about 
a better result—one that is more tailored to the specific case? We do not want to 
just smooth over relevant facts. Notably, this is the case from both backward-
looking and forward-looking perspectives of tort law.  
Response to Objection 1a: It is true that in identifying problems with the 
VSL approach, I pointed to the fact that it seemed mistaken for the damages sum 
for a decedent’s hedonic loss to be a function of the decedent’s wealth, and I 
pointed to how an individuated version of VSL could yield enormous 
discrepancies between what a tortfeasor would pay for killing Rich and for 
killing Poor—and how this seemed to be a mistake according to both backward-
looking and forward-looking accounts of tort.   
But, for the reasons given in response to Objection 1b, we do (at least in 
theory) want an individuated account. Thus, even if a uniform VSL would 
indeed be better than an individuated VSL in a certain way (namely, that the 
damages sum paid for killing a person would not be a function of the particular 
decedent’s wealth), this would simply be curing a symptom associated with an 
individuated VSL account rather than curing the underlying problem. VSL 
would continue to mistakenly base the damages sum on the wealth of victims 
(even if it is based on an average across the whole population). It carries out the 
happiness-to-money translation in the wrong place whether or not we 
individuate. Instead, in my view, while the damages sum should be a function 
of the decedent’s happiness loss (be it decedent-specific or be it an average 
across the whole population or a subset thereof), it should not be a function of 
the wealth of any decedent, individual or average. Rather, the person whose 
wealth should be relevant for the determination of the damages sum is the 
tortfeasor.  
Thus, if the numbers strike us as mistaken after individuation, this is 
because there is something wrong with the underlying theory that is getting us 
those numbers, not with the individuation. It is the VSL approach’s location of 
the happiness-to-money translation that causes the problem, not its 
individuation. 
B. OBJECTION 2: IS IT NOT BAD THAT, ON YOUR PROPOSAL, HEDONIC LOSS 
DAMAGES WOULD VARY WILDLY DEPENDING ON THE TORTFEASOR’S 
WEALTH? 
Objection 2: You articulated a concern with an individuated VSL that it 
would make the damages sum be a function of a decedent’s wealth and that the 
resulting discrepancies between damages sums for the hedonic loss of poor and 
rich decedents would be a bad result. But if we have an individuated account 
that carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the tortfeasor’s utility 
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curve, as your account advocates for, it seems that we would get a result that is 
similar in the sense that the damages sums could vary just as drastically (due 
here to the wealth differences between very poor and very rich defendants—as 
opposed to being due to the wealth differences between very poor and very rich 
decedents). But this seems to be problematic for the same reasons as in the case 
of the damages discrepancy due to the discrepancy between decedents’ wealth, 
namely: (1) It seems that the happiness loss to the decedents is the same (as we 
could stipulate), and thus the damages sum should be the same; and (2) relatedly, 
even if we are just looking at any particular case and there thus were no 
“discrepancy” between the results in two different cases (and thus no horizontal 
equity concerns), it seems that the damages sum for the decedent’s hedonic loss 
would be so much a function of the defendant’s wealth that the damages sum 
would feel arbitrary (and, seemingly, due to luck) from the perspective of the 
plaintiff. And we seemingly do not want this type of luck to be playing such a 
significant role in our tort system.  
Response to Objection 2: First, with respect to the second aspect of this 
objection, that the monetary amount the plaintiff receives seems arbitrary and 
due too much to luck: It absolutely is not arbitrary. Yes, it might seem slightly 
odd at first that the monetary loss is not fully determined by facts specific to the 
decedent (as opposed to having the defendant’s wealth play a role), but, as I have 
argued above: (1) It actually is incoherent to attempt to carry out the happiness-
to-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve because he no longer is alive 
and there is no financial equivalent for the lost years that can be derived on his 
utility curve, which does not exist; and (2) even if the happiness-to-money 
translation could be carried out on the decedent’s utility curve, the optimally 
efficient incentives would be produced by carrying out the translation on the 
defendant’s utility curve. Thus, this method is not arbitrary; it is principled, and 
it is efficient (at least in theory). Further, as stated above, it does crucially take 
as an input the amount of happiness lost by the decedent; it thus fashions a 
remedy that hypothetically compensates for this loss and makes the tortfeasor 
internalize it in his decision-making.  
Second, there indeed is truth to the concern that the damages sum is in part 
a function of luck. The damages sum could vary widely and it might seem like 
the plaintiff gets a windfall benefit if the tortfeasor is very rich and the plaintiff 
gets a huge damages sum, and that the plaintiff gets very unlucky if it turns out 
that the defendant is very poor and the plaintiff thus receives very little in 
damages.  
It is worth noting, however, that an individualized VSL system, though it 
does not involve “luck” in the same sense, would involve an apparently 
irrelevant factor in its determination of damages to the exact same degree, 
namely, the wealth of the decedent. Thus, there is a sense in which both views 
have this common. Furthermore, if we view the individuated VSL account from 
the perspective of the tortfeasor, the exact same type of “luck” would be present, 
because the damages sum would be highly affected by the wealth of the other 
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party, and here the tortfeasor might have had no reason to know, in advance, 
what the wealth of the person turning out to be the decedent would have been. 
Of course, in my view, the decedent’s wealth indeed is irrelevant to the damages 
sum, but the defendant’s wealth is not irrelevant, since considering it is 
necessary to create optimal incentives. My point, though, is just that we must 
live with some variability, so long as this variability is related to a relevant 
consideration. And if it is, then that variation must, in theory at least, be 
accepted.  
This all leaves open the possibility that a system which appears to the 
public to be too luck-based could cause disutility for that reason. To the extent 
people find it unfair that compensation is a function of defendant’s wealth (and 
the way in which the sum could thus also vary widely from being very high to 
very low),144 and to the extent that our intuitions and tastes are that we think it 
should be (1) more tied to the plaintiff’s situation, or, perhaps (2) be more 
uniform, regardless of whether or how much it looks to the plaintiff’s situation 
versus the defendant’s situation, then the answer here about what we should do 
thus ties in to the clarification with which I began this Part: We indeed must 
fully take into account the utility and disutility caused by my proposal in 
practice, and then these results must be weighed together with what I argue are 
the efficiency benefits that are brought about more generally, in theory, by my 
proposal. How these various effects weigh against each other on net is an 
empirical question that I have not yet attempted to answer.  
Lastly, the objection stated that the discrepancy between the sums paid to 
two similarly situated decedents would be problematic in the same sense that it 
would be for discrepancies arising when using an individuated VSL account 
because the damages should be the same if the happiness loss is the same. For 
my answer to this concern, however, refer to my answer to Objection 1, which 
covers this point.  
C. OBJECTION 3: WOULD DAMAGES SUMS PRESCRIBED BY YOUR PROPOSAL 
NOT BE UNPALATABLY HIGH TOO? 
At this point it is important to speak to one proposal/argument that I have 
not yet addressed head-on: the proposal/argument offered by Jennifer Arlen that 
I mentioned in Part I.C, but which I have not yet addressed. This Subpart (1) 
quickly reminds the reader of what her proposal/argument is, (2) provides a first 
pass at an explanation of how my account avoids her concerns, (3) provides an 
objection she might raise in response to my comments, and (4) provides a 
response to her potential response to my comments.  
 1. Arlen’s proposal/argument. Arlen argues that a damages sum that is 
fully compensatory to the decedent would be an infinite number of dollars and 
 
 144. Of course, the damages sum is not a function only of the defendant’s wealth. It is also a function of the 
happiness loss incurred by the decedent. 
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thus that full compensation to the decedent is not possible.145 Relatedly, if the 
damages sum were infinite, this would amount to requiring the defendant to pay 
all his money to wrongful-death plaintiffs. According to Arlen, however, we 
should not seek a compensatory sum, because we would not want to live in a 
world where the damages sum were indeed fully compensatory.146 She argues 
that we need to take into account that we are all not only involuntary sellers of 
our lives but also involuntary buyers of the lives of others.147 In light of this, she 
argues, instead of focusing on what a fully compensatory damages sum would 
be, we should seek to articulate a damages rule, which would be less than fully 
compensatory, and which we would want for our society to implement.148 
According to her, a rule of full compensation would result in most productive 
activities grinding to a halt because people would fear being bankrupted in the 
event that the risk of their causing someone else’s death comes to fruition.149 
Thus, she argues, we would prefer to live in a world in which wrongful-death 
plaintiffs receive (and wrongful-death defendants pay) less than full 
compensation.150 She leaves open the question of what less-than-fully-
compensatory sum would be best. 
2. My first explanation of how my account avoids Arlen’s concerns. In my 
view, my solution enables us to avoid Arlen’s objection/suggestion. She was 
operating under the assumption that full compensation would be infinite (or, in 
practice, equal in any particular case to however much money the tortfeasor has). 
I have argued, though, that the appropriate way to articulate the loss to the 
decedent is in terms of a happiness sum and not a monetary sum. This happiness 
sum, representing the amount of happiness lost by the decedent, thus is equal to 
the “compensatory happiness sum.” Then, I argued that we translate the 
happiness sum into a monetary sum on the defendant’s utility curve. Thus, this 
amount is the compensatory monetary sum, and this monetary sum is finite. 
Thus, according to my account, we indeed are able to identify a finite 
compensatory damages sum and we thus avoid the problem that Arlen envisions. 
Accordingly, on my view, we need not do what Arlen argues that we must do: 
We need not abandon a “fully compensatory sum” in favor of espousing a rule 
that articulates a damages sum that is less than fully compensatory. 
3. An objection Arlen might raise in response to my comments. Arlen might 
respond as follows: Is your proposal not relevantly similar to the type of an 
account where we charge the tortfeasor an infinite amount of money? An infinite 
amount, or even any finite amount that equals a defendant’s full monetary 
wealth, would be too high of a damages sum because it would stunt our ability 
to carry out activities in life. Your proposal may still stunt such activities, even 
 
 145. Arlen, supra note 5, at 1124. 
 146. Id. at 1136. 
 147. Id. at 1135. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1136. 
 150. Id. 
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though it does not require infinite damages. If the finite sum it prescribes is equal 
to or greater than a defendant’s net worth, then the situation will be identical to 
the one I decry, and even if it is somewhat less than the defendant’s net worth, 
it still might be a sum that we think is too high and which will stunt activities to 
some degree. Or, said differently, we would prefer to live in a world where the 
damages sums for these cases are lower—where plaintiffs would receive less 
and defendants would pay less. Thus, Arlen might say that even if we use what 
my account calls the compensatory sum rather than the compensatory sum she 
considered, a rule that provides less than full compensation might still be better. 
Thus, in sum, Arlen might say that the general gist of her discussion would apply 
almost as much to my proposal and that I thus do not successfully avoid her 
objection.  
4. My response to Arlen’s potential response to my comments. These 
indeed are fair points. But I think that my position succeeds, and here is why.  
First of all, I think that employing the damages sum that my proposal 
prescribes would indeed bring about the socially optimal amount of care—it is 
efficient for the potential tortfeasor to internalize the expected happiness loss of 
the victim in his decision making (that is, the probability of happiness loss 
multiplied by the amount of happiness loss that the victim would incur if the loss 
occurs). Any lower of a damages sum would (by definition) result in sub-optimal 
under-deterrence of the potential tortfeasor’s risky activity. This is the case even 
if the damages sum would be so high as to bankrupt the potential tortfeasor if 
his risky activity ends up causing harm and if he incurs liability. If the damages 
sum that my account prescribes deters the (rational and non-risk-averse) 
potential tortfeasor from engaging in this activity, then (by definition) this just 
implies that it is socially optimal for the potential tortfeasor to not engage in the 
activity in this case.   
Second, consider activities where the potential tortfeasor’s activity indeed 
is socially beneficial on net—where we thus do not want the potential 
tortfeasor’s internalization of harm incurred to deter him from engaging in the 
activity. In a case of this type, my account’s damages measure, by definition, 
does not result in so high of a happiness cost internalized that the (rational and 
non-risk-averse) tortfeasor does not engage in the activity. Properly calculated, 
this damages sum will not over-deter the potential tortfeasor, and the potential 
tortfeasor will still engage in the activity. As for how this point squares with 
Arlen’s potential rejoinder, my point here amounts to denying that (rational and 
non-risk-averse) potential tortfeasors would actually be deterred from engaging 
in the socially beneficial activities that she is concerned that they would be 
deterred from engaging in, and, thus, in my view, in these situations, socially 
beneficial activities will not actually grind to a halt—contrary to the scenario 
she envisions. As for why I do not think that the potential tortfeasor typically 
would be deterred in cases like this, it is because, typically, the probability of 
the harm coming to fruition is sufficiently low that the expected liability costs 
are quite low. I think that Arlen’s potential rejoinder is not sufficiently taking 
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into consideration the extent to which the low probability of the harm coming to 
fruition lowers the expected happiness cost being internalized.  
In addition to this potential source of the disagreement between my 
position and Arlen’s potential position (that is, in cases where it is socially 
optimal for the potential tortfeasor to engage in the activity), there is one other 
potential source of the disagreement, and it arises out of one remaining scenario 
I have yet to consider: cases in which it is socially optimal for the tortfeasor to 
engage in the activity (and where a rational and non-risk-averse potential 
tortfeasor thus would still engage in the activity despite there being a risk of 
liability), but where the potential tortfeasor is risk-averse, and sufficiently so that 
the expected liability costs deter him from engaging in the activity that it is 
socially optimal to engage in.  
In this last type of case, the inefficient result (of the potential tortfeasor 
failing to engage in the activity that it is socially optimal to engage in) indeed 
might be brought about by the damages sum prescribed by my account. In cases 
like this, however, the solution is not to alter the damages sum. After all, for the 
reasons I have articulated, my account does prescribe the correct amount of 
internalization. The problem in the context of the risk-averse potential tortfeasor 
lies elsewhere—with the potential tortfeasor’s risk aversion. And this problem 
thus can be solved in the same way as the problem of risk aversion gets addressed 
in other contexts: with the purchase of insurance (or with the development of a 
market for insurance). Accordingly, in order to guard against a “bankrupting” 
tort payout, what we want—and could expect—is for the potential tortfeasor to 
purchase insurance (and for an insurance market to develop if a market for it 
does not already exist). Thus, having bought insurance, the potential tortfeasor 
would not be deterred from engaging in the socially optimal behavior, and the 
efficient outcome will result.   
In my view, as long as the internalization-of-expected-happiness-loss 
calculus is carried out correctly, we will get the damages sum that provides 
optimal deterrence (neither over-deterring nor under-deterring)—even if the 
sum appears high. In some cases, however, risk-aversion combined with the lack 
of insurance might result in this damages sum causing over-deterrence. The 
solution to this problem, however, does not involve changing the damages sum 
(which indeed is optimal); the solution to this problem—which is simply a risk-
aversion problem that is not specific to the wrongful death context, but, rather, 
is much more general—is the same as in other contexts: the purchase of 
insurance.151  
 
 151. In light of the points I make here about insurance, one might wonder whether purchasing insurance 
also could have prevented net-socially-beneficial activities from grinding to a halt even if the damages sum were 
higher than the sum prescribed by my account (and closer to the “infinite compensatory sum” considered by 
Arlen). See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text. This depends on what the insurance premiums cost 
and on how much of a benefit would be derived from engaging in the activity. (Of course, practically speaking, 
even if a damages sum were used that were higher than that which my account prescribes, it could not literally 
be an infinite sum.) For my purposes, however, we need not explore whether insurance would prevent society 
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D. OBJECTION 4: HOW DOES YOUR PROPOSAL WORK IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CORPORATE PARTIES? 
Objection 4: You argue that the happiness-to-money translation should 
occur on the defendant’s utility curve and thus that the defendant’s wealth is 
relevant to determining the damages sum. But many parties in litigation are 
corporations or other entities that do not in any straightforward sense have a 
utility function, a happiness level, or a disposition, and for which the measure of 
wealth might be less straightforward than it would be for a person as well.   
Response to Objection 4: This is an important question, and it can be 
responded to in various ways, each of which would be consistent with my 
account. It seems that the most plausible response will be to use the average 
values among all members of the group (shareholders, for example, if the entity 
is a corporation) for all of the various categories (for example, utility curves, 
happiness sums, dispositions, wealth levels, and so on). Of course, there will 
always be a question about how precise we want the data to be and whether we 
can simply take averages at a high level of abstraction without determining the 
various details for all of the relevant individuals. This, however, is a question 
that is not unique to the context of this objection (that is, corporate parties). The 
question of averaging among members of groups was addressed in Part III,152 
and the analysis there applies here as well. Additionally, as stated there, the level 
of detail of data sought could differ in different cases, and there is no single 
answer, in the abstract, about how much detail should be sought.   
V.  OUTLOOK 
In this Part, I first explain why, from a forward-looking perspective, in 
death cases, we should not only adopt my account in theory, but also implement 
it in practice. Next, I expand the Article’s focus to include consideration of the 
backward-looking account of tort law and I explore if and how it affects my 
proposal. Relatedly, I explain an interesting benefit to exploring the death case: 
I show how the death case is uniquely positioned to teach us about the 
relationship between forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort 
law. I then very briefly describe concerns that could be raised about whether my 
proposed use of tort law is the best legal machinery we have (as opposed to, say, 






from grinding to a halt if the damages sum employed were higher than that which my account prescribes; it is 
sufficient to explore how insurance could interact with a regime employing the damages sum that I argue indeed 
provides optimal deterrence. 
 152. See supra Part III. 
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A. FROM A FORWARD-LOOKING PERSPECTIVE, WHY, IN DEATH CASES, WE 
SHOULD NOT ONLY ADOPT MY PROPOSAL IN THEORY, BUT ALSO 
IMPLEMENT IT IN PRACTICE 
In Part IV.A, I noted that while my view is that my account provides 
incentives that are optimal in theory, it is consistent with my account that it could 
bring about disutility in various forms when implemented in practice. Thus, it 
becomes an empirical project both (1) to determine what the effects of my 
proposal are in practice, and (2) to determine how to weigh the efficiency 
benefits of my account against any disutility that it causes in practice. Thus, as I 
said in Part IV.A, it could be that it turns out, at one extreme, that either there is 
never any disutility brought about by my account or that the disutility it creates 
is always outweighed by its benefits. If so, we should always adopt what my 
account prescribes in theory that we do. At the other extreme, it could be that 
the disutility caused by my theory always outweighs the benefits it would 
provide, and we thus should never implement my account in practice. Instead, it 
could be that my account prescribes that we always use the VSL approach, or 
some third option. Likewise, it could be that in practice the account would 
prescribe that we use a non-individuated rule.153   
Although these questions are empirical in nature and working them out is 
beyond the scope of this Article, I will here hazard a guess about how these 
various considerations might weigh out on net, and thus what my estimation is 
of how tort law ideally should treat damages for a decedent’s hedonic loss. 
“Ideally” thus does not mean “in theory.” “Ideally” takes into account the 
practicalities of the world in terms of, for example, tastes of fairness, particular 
preferences, incentive effects, and the like.  
My estimate is that it is likely best even in practice to implement my 
proposal to determine damages for decedents’ hedonic loss. In short, I think that 
any disutility brought about by my proposal in this context would be minimal. 
There are a few reasons for this.  
For one, consider the potential disutility of my proposal when compared to 
the disutility of the current state of the law, to the potential disutility caused by 
a VSL approach (an individuated version and a non-individuated version), and 
also when compared to the potential disutility caused by a non-individuated 
version of my account.  
The status quo does not allow for any damages whatsoever for hedonic loss 
(in the vast majority of jurisdictions). Despite this omission in the law, however, 
there does not appear to be much public outcry or disutility being incurred as a 
result. Part of this, perhaps, is due to the fact that there are various other things 
 
 153. Recall that, as I have already argued, my proposal is of value for a variety of reasons even if it turns 
out that my proposal, in practice, prescribes that the proposal never be used at all. Thus, whether or not my 
proposal has value does not depend on the outcome of this discussion. At stake in this section’s discussion is 
only how prevalent the cases are where we should bring about reform. 
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that wrongful-death plaintiffs can recover for (for example, financial support for 
the spouse, consortium, and so on). This is relevant for three reasons.  
First, plaintiffs typically are not ending up empty-handed and thus perhaps 
they are not left upset about the damages sum; additionally, the fact that there 
are various things that can be recovered for might, perhaps, make it the case that 
people are not inspecting too closely what dollar sums are for what. Further, 
given that consortium or other non-economic damages claims require the use of 
exchange rates between happiness and money, and given that it is always 
difficult to have strong intuitions about what sums of money are appropriate for 
what sums of happiness, there will be a certain sense of arbitrariness present that 
will make it difficult for a plaintiff to feel strongly that a particular dollar sum 
would have been more appropriate than that which was awarded. Now, if we 
also throw in additional monetary damages for hedonic loss (as calculated by 
my proposal), it seems as though this (1) would be for the most part a welcome 
addition from the perspective of plaintiffs, and (2) for all of the reasons just 
described in the context of the current state of the law, it seems as though the 
damages sum for this particular component of the overall damages award might 
get somewhat lost track of and thus not cause great disutility. Hence my proposal 
would represent, in theory and in practice, an improvement over the status quo.  
Second, the same is true when we compare my view to the individuated 
VSL approach. Similar concerns—for example, the seeming arbitrariness of 
damages being a function of level of wealth of one of the parties—would be 
considerably more significant with the individuated VSL approach than with 
mine. For instance, differing awards for decedents with different levels of wealth 
would surely rouse greater intuitions of inequity than differences among 
defendants, because it would appear to be attributing differing “values” to a life 
in some deeper sense, even if that is not in fact the actual rationale for the 
individuated VSL approach. Thus, there is reason to think that the disutility 
associated with my account, if present, would be less than the disutility 
associated with an individuated VSL approach.  
Third, the same is true for disutility of my approach as compared to that 
associated with a non-individuated VSL approach and a non-individuated 
version of my approach, I think that my account would indeed bring about 
greater initial disutility than both of these approaches, but that this disutility 
would be outweighed by the efficiency benefits of my account. This is 
particularly the case when my account is compared to the non-individuated VSL 
account, because of what I take to be the substantial benefits of carrying out the 
happiness-to-money translation on the defendant’s utility curve rather than that 
of the plaintiff. But I think that the benefits of my account would also outweigh 
the disutility as compared to a non-individuated version of my account—even if 
less starkly. 
Leaving aside these comparisons between the disutility caused by my 
account and by others, there is an additional strong reason to think that the 
disutility of my account would not be great enough to outweigh its benefits: 
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considering the context of punitive damages. As I have stated, punitive damages 
typically do take into account the wealth of defendants. This is a key test case. 
Just as with my proposal, the particular damages sum in question with punitive 
damages is a function of the defendant’s wealth. Further, as with my proposal, 
the damages sum for punitive damages does not constitute the full damages 
award, but, rather, it is merely a part of it (in my context, there can still be awards 
for spousal financial support and consortium, for example, and in the punitive-
damages context there are also compensatory damages). In light of the similarity 
between these contexts, we can look to the punitive-damages context to see 
whether there is public outcry or whether there appears to be disutility incurred 
as a result of taking the wealth of the defendant in a case into account, and it 
does not appear that this disutility exists. A key feature of both contexts is the 
fact there are also other components to the damages award, as stated above. This 
likely is key in avoiding disutility, because a party that otherwise might be 
displeased can at least feel as though there is still the standard part of the 
damages award that does not employ the feature that he dislikes. Then, the aspect 
that he dislikes is just part of the award, and this might minimize the disutility 
incurred by this displeased party. Further, it could then more easily be 
rationalized that “x” is the part of damages award that does “w” (for example, 
appropriately compensates the plaintiff), whereas “y” is the part of the damages 
award that does “z” (for example, provides optimal deterrence for future 
potential tortfeasors). This split could result in less disutility to the displeased 
party.  
Lastly, while there indeed might be concerns about the administrability of 
my account, we deal with similar administrability issues in various ways 
successfully when we consider the defendant’s wealth in the context of punitive 
damages. As for the questions of happiness quantification, these indeed might 
present issues that are new in certain ways, but these questions could be 
appropriately dealt with as well if proper procedures are employed, thus enabling 
my proposal to be implemented.  
In sum, the question of whether or not practical considerations might result 
in it being better to not employ my proposal in some or all cases, despite my 
proposal being better in theory, remains an empirical question that I do not 
resolve here. Despite this, however, the foregoing considerations provide strong 
reason to think that, even in practice, we should use my account to determine 




 154. Even if my empirical estimate is correct, however, and even if we employ my proposal, we still, going 
forward, must keep our eyes open and see if the account appears to cause disutility. If it does (and even if the 
disutility does not outweigh the benefits of my account as compared to one of the other candidate accounts), it 
could be that it would at that point be wise to make some changes to the rule (even if only minor tweaks) to 
reduce this disutility if this can be done without losing too many of the utility benefits of my proposal. 
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B. HOW EXPANDING FOCUS TO INCLUDE THE BACKWARD-LOOKING 
ACCOUNT OF TORT LAW AFFECTS MY PROPOSAL, AND HOW THE DEATH 
CASE IS UNIQUELY POSITIONED TO TEACH US ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FORWARD-LOOKING AND BACKWARD-LOOKING ACCOUNTS OF 
TORT 
1. The Implications for My Proposal of Taking Both Backward-Looking 
and Forward-Looking Views into Account Intrinsically 
Throughout the Article up until this point, I have been talking almost 
entirely about the forward-looking account of tort law—according to which the 
purpose of tort law is optimal deterrence (bringing about optimal incentives for 
future potential tortfeasors).155 Although I have referred to the backward-
looking account (the account focused on compensation of the plaintiff), I have 
only been discussing this account in a particular and circumscribed way. More 
specifically, when I have discussed the backward-looking, plaintiff-
compensation-focused account, I have only been doing so instrumentally, within 
the context of a forward-looking account. In other words, I have been 
considering the backward-looking account only for the purpose of considering 
the fact that people often have intuitions of fairness156 that comport with a 
backward-looking account, and thus that a forward-looking account must take 
these intuitions at face value and treat any disutility caused by a legal system 
that conflicts with these intuitions as real disutility to be included in the calculus 
of determining what rule is optimal.  
But this is not the whole picture. The backward-looking view is not merely 
a view that is relevant instrumentally because of how it plugs into the forward-
looking view. Indeed, the backward-looking view is the view that many, if not 
most, people would say intrinsically describes the main purpose (or perhaps only 
appropriate purpose) of tort law.157 And, while perhaps some would think that 
tort law is or should be viewed (intrinsically) only through a forward-looking 
lens and while perhaps some would think that tort law is or should be viewed 
(intrinsically) only through a backward-looking lens, many people would 
recognize that both lenses are and should be viewed as (intrinsically) relevant to 
tort law. Thus, most people would think that viewing tort law through a 
backward-looking lens is at least part of the picture. And because up until now 
I have only been considering a forward-looking account, I have not been taking 
into account the whole picture. But now I broaden my view and briefly consider 
the full picture.  
Intrinsically valuing the backward-looking view of tort law (be it either as 
the full picture or as part of the picture alongside a forward-looking view) could 
 
 155. See supra Part I.A. 
 156. See Pressman, supra note 17. 
 157. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 25; Coleman, supra note 25; COLEMAN, supra note 25; WEINRIB, supra 
note 25; Pressman, supra note 27. 
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be a strong reason why in non-death cases we typically might want to use the 
plaintiff’s utility curve. See my discussion elsewhere158 for in-depth 
consideration of non-death cases and how the theory I propose in this Article 
applies in non-death cases. Interestingly, however, death cases are importantly 
different from non-death cases with respect to these issues. Absent one thinking 
that the estate should be compensated for the decedent’s hedonic loss, the death 
case seemingly provides us with a case where compensation is not possible, yet 
deterrence is. Thus, even if one typically thinks that the forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts of tort are both intrinsically part of the picture, death 
cases are unique in that compensation for (a backward-looking approach to) the 
hedonic loss is off the table, and all that remains is deterrence of (a forward-
looking approach to) hedonic loss.  
As a result of the fact that, in the death cases, deterrence seems to be the 
only game in town, my discussion in Part V.A (about how, according to the 
forward-looking view, my account likely should not only be implemented in 
theory but also in practice, pending confirmation of my empirical estimates) 
indeed seems to be the full picture. And, as a result, my view is that, pending 
those empirical estimates, we should indeed implement my account both in 
theory and also in practice in death cases.  
2. General Upshots About What the Death Case Enables Us to Learn 
About the Interaction Between the Forward-Looking and Backward-
Looking Accounts 
Although I originally had set out to provide a solution for the death case, it 
turns out that the death case is also an interesting case because of what it enables 
us to learn about tort theory more generally. This is because it is unique in that 
(1) there is a loss incurred by a person that we can quantify (albeit in terms of 
happiness and not money), we can calculate “hypothetical compensation,” and 
thus we can aim to deter, but (2) our purpose is not also compensation because 
the person to whom the compensation would be due no longer exists. As a result, 
in determining the damages sum, we can focus on deterrence exclusively. I have 
argued, contra the various authors who are proponents of VSL, that when we 
focus on deterrence exclusively, it should be the defendant’s utility curve that 
we focus on. On the other hand, in cases where the victim is not dead, the 
backward-looking account of tort law would typically keep us thinking in terms 
of the plaintiff’s utility curve (due both to intrinsic backward-looking 
considerations and instrumental ones). As a result, in typical (non-death) cases, 
we fail to see that the deterrence aspect of the issue is actually something that 
should involve analysis of the defendant’s utility curve.  
It is the death case, however, that helps separate the moving parts and thus 
helps us arrive at these conclusions. But even once this separation occurs, the 
 
 158. See supra Part III.C; Pressman, supra note 17. 
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authors who are proponents of VSL simply assume that we should be using the 
plaintiff’s utility curve, and this is because we seemingly always use the 
plaintiff’s utility curve. But this is a mistake. Once we are focused only on 
deterrence, as we are in the death case, we no longer are constrained by the 
compensation norm, and we must recognize this and realize that we must then 
shift our focus to the defendant’s utility curve.  
These insights are important not only for the purpose of bringing about the 
best rules in the context of death. In addition, these insights help us to better 
understand what is relevant for the purposes of deterrence, more generally. To 
the extent that one thinks that deterrence is at least one relevant part of the picture 
in cases where compensation is possible, the considerations I discuss here should 
inform ways of thinking about how to fashion remedies that in varying degrees, 
in different cases, further both a backward-looking goal and a forward-looking 
goal. 
C. IS MY PROPOSED USE OF TORT LAW THE BEST LEGAL MACHINERY FOR 
PURSUING THIS ARTICLE’S GOALS? 
Here I only briefly raise the concern that some might have about whether 
my proposed use of tort law is the best legal machinery we have for pursuing 
this Article’s goals.  
For someone who does not believe that tort law should care about forward-
looking considerations at all, then it certainly would seem as though tort law is 
not the correct machinery to use. However, even for someone who does think 
that forward-looking considerations can be appropriate for tort law, he might 
still think that, in this context, other machinery might be better.  
For example, one thought might be that criminal law could or should 
address this. After all, in many (though not all) of these cases, the risk of death 
that the tortfeasor is causing is one that is diffuse and that risks harming large 
segments of the population. To the extent that this is the case, one might think 
this renders it ripe for criminal law.  
There might be compelling reasons in both directions, and I will not further 
explore these here. Suffice it to say, though, that if the criminal punishment were 
a fine, then the considerations explored in this Article would still be of prime 
importance. If non-monetary punishments were considered for this in the 
criminal law, then a wide range of other considerations would come into play.  
Another thought one might have would be that punitive damages could 
satisfactorily bring about appropriate deterrence for hedonic loss. After all, a key 
function of punitive damages is deterrence.  
First of all, however, the mental-state requirements that typically bring 
matters into the domain of punitive damages need not be present in cases of 
death and hedonic loss. Thus, the cases lacking these features seemingly would 
not be reached by punitive damages. Or, even if we were to make exceptions 
and say that all cases of hedonic loss are potentially subject to punitive damages, 
May 2021] HEDONIC-LOSS DAMAGES THAT OPTIMALLY DETER 1571 
it seems that this would amount to making a change to punitive-damages 
doctrine rather than it being the case that all cases of hedonic loss can be 
addressed by current punitive-damages doctrine.  
Either way, though, this seemingly amounts to somewhat of a definitional 
question. In my view, we should not try to get the desired result in these cases 
by squeezing them into the punitive-damages domain. Rather, we could coin a 
term for a third area of damages that is neither punitive damages nor 
compensatory damages: “death damages” or “hedonic loss damages.” There 
seemingly is no need to squeeze a new category of damages into one of the 
existing categories if the fit is not good and if there is no need to do so.  
Leaving aside the question of how to classify these awards, however, there 
still remains the all-important question of what the damages sum should be. That 
is the important question, and that is the question that this Article has been 
addressing. What specific classification we attribute to these damages is of less 
importance.  
Suffice it to say there are various interesting questions here that merit 
further probing. At the very least, however, it does not seem that there is a clear 
reason that the tort framework addressed here is not a viable candidate for 
handling these issues.159 
CONCLUSION 
Having one’s life brought to a premature end is seemingly one of the 
greatest harms that one can incur, and this is attributable to the decedent’s 
hedonic loss, which in most cases probably is immense. This harm, of course, is 
irreparable, with no damages sum being able to restore the decedent’s life, but 
this does not mean that wrongful-death plaintiffs should not be able to recover 
damages for the decedent’s hedonic loss. Whether wrongful-death plaintiffs 
should recover for the decedent’s hedonic loss according to a backward-looking 
account of tort law is debatable; but what, in my view, is not debatable is that 
defendants should be required to pay hedonic-loss damages so that future 
potential tortfeasors are optimally deterred when engaging in activities that risk 
causing death. If we value our lives and those of others, then this conclusion, I 
think, is clear.  
How to determine the dollar sum to assign to loss of life, however, is 
considerably less clear, and reasonable minds can differ as to which approach to 
take. The VSL approach, which is by far the dominant approach, in my view is 
 
 159. Another thought that one might have, however, is that there is not even any need for any new treatment 
of these cases, because it is a mistake to even think that there currently is under-deterrence of activities that risk 
causing death and hedonic loss. Perhaps, one might say, punitive damages for intentional behavior and also 
criminal law in many cases sufficiently deter potential tortfeasors. For the reasons discussed in this Subpart, 
however, it seems unlikely that criminal law and punitive damages reach all or even most cases of hedonic loss, 
and thus it seems unlikely that the current level of deterrence is optimal. Perhaps there are also other avenues 
that work to contribute to the amount of deterrence of activities causing death, but, even taking everything into 
account, it seems unlikely to me that the current level of deterrence is sufficiently high. 
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mistaken for a variety of reasons, three of which are its failings in terms of (1) 
theoretical coherence, (2) equity, and (3) efficiency. In its place, I have proposed 
an alternative approach that I think fares better on all three of these scores. What 
I have presented here is only a sketch, however, and further questions are likely 
to arise if it is implemented; but, in my view, there are reasons to be optimistic 
that—both theoretically and in practice—the account I have provided will 
constitute a step in the right direction. 
How will things be different if my approach is implemented? As compared 
to the status quo, damages sums in wrongful death cases would surely increase 
dramatically. As compared to damages sums prescribed by the VSL approach 
(be it individuated or non-individuated), it is not completely clear which 
approach would give rise to higher damages sums on average. While there are 
many moving parts that affect this, perhaps none would have a larger effect than 
the determination made—be it by judges, the jury, legislators, or other 
decisionmakers—about which happiness aggregation function is the most 
plausible. Other theoretical details remain to be worked out too, however, and 
many empirical results and effects remain to be seen. Additionally, if this 
account were implemented, it would also remain to be seen how various 
industries—such as the insurance industry—would be affected and how parties 
would act (and transact) in the shadow of the law. 
Despite these many uncertainties, I hope to have re-oriented the 
conversation toward a more fruitful path forward.  
